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C. Jurisdiction 
This Court has jurisdiction over this action pursuant to 
Section 78-2a-3(2)(d), Utah Code, plus Rule 3 and 4 Utah Court of 
Appeals. 
D. Nature of Proceedings 
This is an Appeal from an Order of the Circuit Court striking 
defendant's Appeal as not being timely, which allowed defendants to 
be evicted from their home since the Court further denied Defendant 
the right to put up a Supersedeas Bond based upon the Court's 
belief that it would not be overruled. 
E. Statement of Issues on Appeal 
I. In an action for restitution and possession of real 
property, where no mention of Unlawful Detainer is acknowledged in 
the Complaint or Summons and the Complaint reserves the right to 
amend if plaintiff is damaged by defendants causing a potential 
sale of the property to fall through, does the action fall under 
the ten day limitation UCA 78-36-11, for appeal from an Unlawful 
Detainer action or does the appeal period become thirty days, under 
Rule 4, Utah R. App. P. 
II* If the action is found to be one of Unlawful Detainer, 
where the Judgment was filed on September 10, 1990, and was mailed 
by plaintiff to defendants on the same day; and on September 21, 
-vi-
1990, a Bankruptcy with its Automatic Stay was filed by defendants 
Gary and Peggy Salazar, which Automatic Stay was released by the 
Bankruptcy Judge late in the afternoon on September 25, 1990 and 
filed with the Circuit Court on September 26, 1990, does one add 
the three days for mailing plus the four days during which the 
Bankruptcy Automatically Stayed the tolling of the Appeal time 
which would then make the Appeal filed on September 26, 1990 
timely? 
III. Did the Court have the power to deny Appellants the 
right of putting forth a Supersedeas Bond to Stay Execution on the 
Judgment until the Appeal could be heard? 
F. Determinative Statutes 
The statutes and rules which defendant Gary Salazar believes 
may be determinative are copied or set forth in their entirety in 
Appendix I hereto. 
STATEMENT OF CASE 
A. Nature of the Case 
This is an Appeal from a Final Judgment or Decree of the 
Circuit Court denying Appellant the right of appeal to the Supreme 
Court for the State of Utah. This was based upon the Court's 
belief that this was a Statutory Unlawful Detainer Action and 
therefore only ten days were allowable for the Appeal to be made 
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instead of thirty days and that Appellants1 (defendants1) Appeal 
therefore was not timely. R 9-10. In making its determination the 
Circuit Court failed to take into consideration the Automatic Stay 
of the Bankruptcy Court with added four additional days to the 
Appeal Period- E 16-17. 
B. Course of Proceedings 
Ford Consumer Finance served Appellants (defendants) Gary 
Salazar, et al . , with a Notice of Trustee's Sale to be held on the 
real property located at 1886 Foxmoor Circle, Sandy, Utah, on the 
8 ' th day of May, 1990. Appellant, Gary Salazar met with Gary 
Powers, the agent of Ford Consumer Finance (Appellee), to pay a 
part of the back payments. These funds were accepted by Gary 
Powers but after the time for the Trustee Sale was over, Powers 
returned said funds to Salazar stating that the sale was complete. 
Subsequently, a ten day notice to move was served by Ford on 
the Salazars followed by service of a three day Summons and 
Complaint which demanded restitution, possession of the property, 
and claimed Unlawful Detention. 
The Salazars answered Ford's Complaint, denying that the 
Trustee's Sale was effective and claiming that the title for the 
real property was still in the Salazars. 
At the trial the Salazars (Appellants) complained that the 
Circuit Court did not have the jurisdiction to make a determination 
on who held the title to the property under UCA section 78-4-7(1). 
The Circuit Court determined that it was not determining title to 
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the property. R 9-11. 
The Circuit Court, after the evidence on the title to the 
property presented found that the Trusteefs Sale was valid and gave 
restitution and possession of the property to Ford. This Judgment 
was signed on September 10, 1990 and was mailed to the Salazars on 
that same day. R 3. 
On the 21fst of October, 1990, Gary Salazar took out a Chapter 
13 Bankruptcy whose Automatic Stay was set aside per an ex parte 
motion of Appellee on the 25fth of September and filed on the 26Tth 
of September with the Circuit Court. R 16-17. Whereupon the 
Salazars immediately filed an appeal from the Circuit Court's 
Judgment of September 10, 1990 on September 26, 1990, R 3., with 
the Circuit Court and filed a Supersedeas Bond. On a shortened 
time schedule, agreed to by the attorneys, at the hearing on the 
Supersedeas Bond, Appellee then proceeded to attack the timeliness 
of the Appeal filing. The Circuit Court found, that the appeal 
was not timely in an Unlawful Detainer Action even though Appellant 
contended that this was not solely and Unlawful Detainer Action but 
was partially an equity action due to the several causes of action 
contained in the Complaint and therefore subject to a thirty day 
appeal period. R 11-12. 
C, Disposition at Hearing 
After the Oral Argument on October 1, 1990, the Court found 
that the action was originally brought as an Unlawful Detainer 
Action and that there were no issues of equity which would take the 
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action outside of the Unlawful Detainer ten day Appeal Rule and 
allow for the thirty day Appeal Rule. In determining that Salazar 
had not met the ten day schedule, the Court, allowed for three days 
for mailing of the Notice and ten days for filing but did not allow 
three days for mailing of the Notice of Appeal. R 10-12. Although 
in later discussions the subject of the bankruptcy and the 
withdrawal of the Automatic Stay being obtained by Appellee was 
acknowledged by the Court, its extension of the ten day rule was 
not discussed or argued but the Circuit Court ruled that it had no 
authority to allow the Appeal and therefore Stayed the Appeal, the 
Court also ruled that a Bond by Appellants would not be allowed to 
retain them in their home pending the outcome of a potential 
Appeal, but that Appellees would have to put up a Bond. R 10-16. 
D. Bond Proceeding 
Subsequent to the Court dismissing Salazars1 Appeal as 
untimely, this Appeal was brought by the Salazars, claiming: 
1. This action was not solely in unlawful detainer but in 
equity and therefore had a thirty day appeal period. 
2. Even in an action in unlawful detainer, the time period 
had not lapsed and therefore was timely because the Automatic Stay 
of the Bankruptcy action, and the three day for receiving the mail. 
R 16-17. 
3. The Circuit Court did not have the right to deny the 
Supersedeas Bond which would then have left the Salazars in their 
property until this Appeal could be heard. R 19-20. 
E. Relevant Facts 
The Salazars (Appellants) purchased the property in August of 
1988. Several times during their period of occupancy they fell 
behind in their payments. Each time Gary Salazar (Appellant) met 
with Ford's (Appellee's) agent, Gary Powers had made substantial 
payments whereby the account was reinstated. 
On the day of the Trustee Sale prior to its execution, 
Appellant met with Appellee and gave a substantial payment which he 
understood would stop the Trustee Sale. After receiving the money, 
Appellee (Powers) talked with Appellant (Salazar) for about an hour 
after which Appellee gave the money back, and said its too late the 
sale is now over. 
SUMMARY OF ARGUMENT 
Utah's Unlawful Detainer Statute offers quick, harsh remedies. 
Its use and applicability must be narrowly construed to specific 
circumstances. 
FIRST DEFENSE. This action was not brought as an Unlawful 
Detainer but as a hybrid or equity action. this case was brought 
as an action against Appellant Salazar to prove that title had been 
transferred by a Trustee's Sale to Ford Consumer Finance (Appellee) 
and if so have Appellants removed from the property. Salazars 
(Appellants) were in turn claiming that the sale was conducted 
under fraudulent circumstances by the Appellee's agent and was 
therefore invalid. 
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Appellee after making allegations of title possession left 
open the possibility in their complaint that damages might be 
suffered by Appellee from Appellants1 refusal to leave the 
property, and therefore reserved in their Complaint the right to 
ask for damages if they lost their Sale to a third party; thereby 
making their action one in equity and subject to a thirty day 
appeal period, 
SECOND DEFENSE. Even if the ten day appeal period was 
followed if credit were given for the three day mailing at front 
and for the time that the Bankruptcy Stay was in force, then the 
Appeal would have been timely. Appellant filed its Appeal on the 
same day the Stay Release was filed with the Court. It could not 
have proceeded any sooner without being in contempt of the 
Bankruptcy Court. 
THIRD DEFENSE. The Court did not have the authority to reject 
Appellants1 use of a Supersedeas Bond based upon the premises that 
Appellees would ultimately win anyway. This would have prevented 
the execution of the Judgment whereby Appellants could have 
remained in their home until the Appeal on the Denial of the Appeal 
could have been heard. 
ARGUMENT 
1. On or about the 28fth day of June 1990, Appellee filed a 
Complaint with the Circuit Court alleging the following: (Appendix 
I) 
a. That a Trustee Sale had taken place and that title to 
the property was now in Appellee's name. (Appendix I, paragraphs 
3, 4) 
b. That because of the Trustee Sale and the transfer of 
ownership that Appellants were now tenants at will. (Appendix I., 
paragraph 5) 
c. That the Appellants had refused to vacate the 
premises, even though given a ten day Notice to Quit Premises had 
been served upon them. (Appendix I, paragraphs 6, 7) 
d. That the Appellants still retained possession of said 
premises and were in "Unlawful Detention thereof", and the 
reasonable rental was $35.00. (Appendix I, paragraph 8) 
e. That Appellee had a prospective buyer for the 
premises and Appellants had interfered with the potential sale. 
(Appendix I, paragraphs 10f 11) 
f. That if the sale fell through due to the actions of 
Appellants which resulted in a loss to Appellee's; Appellees would 
be able to amend the Complaint to reflect the loss. (Appendix I, 
paragraph 12) 
2. In Appellee's prayer for the Judgment and Relief he 
requests the following: (Appendix I, paragraphs a, b, c & d of 
prayer) 
a. An order granting restitution and possession of the 
premises and Court costs. 
b. Judgment for thirty-eight days for $1330.00 and 
$105.00 per day from the date of service of the Notice to Quit 
until Appellee actually takes possession "and for such other and 
further relief as to the Court seems proper". 
3. At no time does Appellee make mention of the unlawful 
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detainer statute or that he is bringing his action pursuant to 
Section 78-36-1 to 78-36-12 UCA. The only mention that even 
closely relates to Unlawful Detainer is a mention that Appellant 
was "in unlawful detention thereof". An Unlawful Detention Action 
according to section 76-5-304 is from the criminal code and is a 
"(1) A. Person commits Unlawful Detention if he knowingly 
restrains another unlawfully so as to interfere substantially with 
his liberty. (2) Unlawful Detention is a Class B misdemeanor". 
4. Furthermore under paragraphs 10, 11, and 12 of Appellee's 
Complaint, the process was set up for proving further damages if 
necessary against Appellants, if a potential sale should fall 
through causing a loss to the Appellee. 
5. While it is true that Appellee requested triple the daily 
rent for each day the Appellants stayed after the Notice to Quit 
had been served, no mention is made as to upon what basis the 
triple rent is allowable. Therefore nowhere is unlawful detainer 
mentioned only restitution and possession of the premise, unlawful 
detention and a desire for equity relief if damages from the non 
sale of the property is suffered. 
6. Under a recent Utah case, Fashions Four Corporation vs. 
Fashion Place Associates 681 P. 2d 830, the Supreme Court found 
that "we are compelled to conclude that the hybrid nature of 
plaintiff's action, containing additional declaratory and equitable 
clauses, and from the defendants' counterclaim with the similar 
clauses, prevents section 78-36-11 from controlling the time for 
appeal". Under an older case, Ottenheimer, et al. vs. Mt. States 
Supply Co. 56 Utah 190, where the court finds "While it is true 
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that the relief prayed for in the first cause of action might have 
been had in a proceeding of forcible detainer, yet it is also true 
that the relief sought and obtained by plaintiff under the second 
cause of action is purely eguitable, and could not have been had in 
a forcible detainer action under our statute. Moreover, the case 
was tried throughout and submitted to the Court, and by it 
determined, as an action in eguity." 
7. What were the requested actions demanded by the Appellee 
in his Complaint? 
a. He requested the Court give him restitution and possession 
of his property- Restitution being an action in equity according 
to Blacks Law Dictionary, "restitution is the act of restoring; 
restoration; restoration of anything to its rightful owner; the act 
of making good or giving eguivalent for any loss, damage, or 
injury;". Under the Common Law a Writ of Restitution was act in 
equity, "Restoration of both parties to their original condition". 
The Appellees did not designate that this was an action in 
Unlawful Detainer. In order to make an issue clear especially 
where rights are clearly effected, i.e., ten day appeal period for 
Unlawful Detainer vs. a thirty day appeal period for all other 
actions, it is necessary for the Complaint to clearly designate 
which theory a plaintiff brings in action. 
b. The second action in equity requested was the alleging the 
potential damages if a sell were lost by the Appellees, and the 
reserving of a right to amend the complaint to reflect that loss if 
it transpired. Even if the Court were to find that the restitution 
and possession of the property was not an equitable action, then 
and possession of the property was not an equitable action, then 
requesting potential relief from the loss of the sale brings it 
back to a hybrid action of both unlawful detainer and equity which 
according to Fashions Four Corporation vs. Fashion Place 
Associates, takes it outside of the ten day Appeal period and makes 
it a thirty day Appeal period. 
8. What did the Judgment entered by the Court designate the 
action under consideration? 
The title to the Judgment signed by the Court was "JUDGMENT, 
JUDGMENT FOR RESTITUTION OF PREMISES AND DECLARING FORFEITURE OF 
TENANCY". (Appendix IV) Nothing in the title designates that this 
was an action brought under the Unlawful Detainer Statute, although 
as a part of the Judgments, Appellees are given triple damages, 
based upon the normal rent to be charged, and triple damages are 
adjudged to be given, until the Appellants leave the premises plus 
that the Appellants "are guilty of unlawful detainer", that "a writ 
of restitution issue"; and "that any interest of" Appellants "to 
lease or tenant said premises" "is forfeited and terminated". Some 
are items incumbent in statutory unlawful detainer but can be parts 
of an action in equity. Certainly if this were an action in 
unlawful detainer under Utah's Act, a designation of qualification 
would be appropriate. At least all parties would know what the 
action really was. 
9. What did the Findings of fact show the action to be? 
Appendix III) 
Under the Finding of Fact the Court made a number of findings 
relative to who held title to the property. It also found that 
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regarding the Appellants and the premises but made no reference to 
whether or not this action was brought as an unlawful detainer 
action. It goes on further to mention that Appellants had claimed 
fraud relative to Appellee's agents relation to the Trustee's Sell 
and found no fraud and then states, "That defendants claims in 
equity regarding the fairness of plaintiff's (Appellant's) actions 
were not sufficiently proven to justify the Court's disallowance of 
the Trustee's Deed, although plaintiff through its attorney, did 
stipulate at the start of trial that the Court could so hold and 
rule, if the evidence so warranted", (Appendix iii, paragraph 8) 
clearly showing that equity was a part of the action either by the 
complaint and the answer thereto or by appellees stipulation in 
open court that the equity issues could be heard. It is also 
evident that the Court had no authority in an action to determine 
title under section 78-4-7(1) UCA, and is beyond its civil 
jurisdiction in both law and equity. 
10. What did the Conclusions of Law find the action to be? 
The Court found that Appellees were owners of the land showing 
that determination as to who had title, had been made. It also 
found that the Appellants had been tenants at will and Appellees 
had followed statutory requirements to evict Appellants from the 
premises but did not state which statutory requirements- still 
leaving undetermined whether this was an action in Statutory 
Unlawful Detainer, or Equity, or both. It found that the 
Appellants are in Unlawful Detention of the premises, (which is a 
criminal action) that the Appellee was entitled to a writ of 
restitution removing Appellants and their belongings from the 
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restitution removing Appellants and their belongings from the 
premises, and that damages including those for triple damages were 
proper. Still at no time is the Statutory Unlawful Retainer 
referred to nor even a guilt of Unlawful Detainer but only a guilt 
of Unlawful Detention, (a criminal act). 
11. Therefore, under none of the Court filings, (Complaint, 
Findings of Fact, or Conclusions of Law) are the Appellants found 
guilty of statutory Unlawful Detainer, but only unlawful detention. 
While it is true that unlawful detainer is mention in the judgment, 
no reference of statutory unlawful detainer is mentioned. 
12. Wherefore, this action was not brought as statutory 
unlawful detainer action but as one for restitution and possession 
of the premises under an equity theory. If the court finds that 
this was a statutory unlawful detainer action under UCA section 78-
36-11, time for appeal then, the equity portions of the Complaint 
would take it outside of the ten day rule under Fashions Four vs. 
Fashion Place Assoc, 681 P.2d 8 30 (Utah 1984), etc. 
13. Supposing the appeal is subject to UCA section 78-36-11, 
ten day appeal period. Was this period complied with? 
Under the Utah Rules of Civil Procedure, Rule 6(e), " whenever 
a party x . . . x is required to do some act within a prescribed 
period after the service of a Notice x . . . x upon him and the 
notice or paper is served upon him by mail, three days shall be 
added to the prescribed period". Since the Judgment was dated the 
10fth day of September, the three days plus the ten days would take 
the due date of the Appeal period to September 23frd. Appellants, 
Salazars filed their Chapter 13 Bankruptcy on September the 21'st. 
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Bankruptcy automatically stayed the tolling of the clock on the 
Appeal for the appellants Gary C. Salazar and Peggy C. Salazar 
which stay was released by the signing of the Order of Relief from 
Automatic Stay by the Bankruptcy Judge on September 25'th (Appendix 
V) and filed by the Appellee with the Circuit Court on September 
26fth. This being the first day that appellant had knowledge that 
the stay was released by the Bankruptcy Court. The Appeal was 
immediately filed on September 26, 1990, along with a Supersedeas 
Appeal Bond which then had been accepted as to form and amount by 
the Court. 
Since the Automatic Stay stopped the tolling of time on the 
Appeal from the 21fst to the 25fth or 26'th, this would have made 
the appeal deadline as the 27fth or 28fth of September well within 
the timing for Appeal. 
14. What effect did appellants non arguing the effect of the 
Bankruptcy on staying the time of Appeal have on extending the time 
limit? 
The meeting time with Appel lant before the Court was shortened 
by mutual consent of appellee with the Appellant, but at the time 
the shortening of the time for the hearing was communicated to 
appellants counsel, the hearing was to be on the appropriateness of 
the Supersedeas Bond not on the Motion to Strike Appeal. Appellant 
was caught by surprise that this Motion was before the Court. The 
fact of the filing for Bankruptcy was given by Appellee's counsel 
and was before the Court. Therefore the striking of the Appeal 
should be overruled by the Court. 
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CONCLUSION 
This action was brought as one in equity and therefore the Appeal 
period should have been thirty days which would have made the 
Appeal of September 26, 1990 timely. 
If the Court finds that this was in fact a Statutory Unlawful 
Detainer action, then the fact that the Complaint left open the 
question of damages if the sell of Appellee failed because 
Appellant stayed on the premises made it an equity action and 
therefore made this an action subject to the thirty day rule. 
The Appeal should be reinstated because it was filed within 
the ten day period. If you took into consideration the additional 
three days for mailing and the four days during which the Automatic 
Stay of the Bankruptcy Court was in effect, the Appeal was filed 
timely and certainly as soon as Appellants could legally file it. 
Under any of the theories, the Appellants filed their Appeal 
as soon as the Stay was lifted. 
THEREFORE, for the above reasons the Circuit Court1s Order 
Striking defendants Appeal should be overruled and the Circuit 
Court ordered to send the Appeal and records on to the Court of 
Appeals. The Court should also rule on whether the lower court 
acted properly in denying Appellants right of filing a Supersedeas 
Bond. 
Respectfully so requested this 14fth day of November, 1991. 
Attorney for Appellant 
CERTIFICATE OF SERVICE 
I hereby certify that on this 14'th day of November, 1991, I 
mailed a true and correct copy, postage prepaid of the foregoing 
BRIEF OF APPELLANT to the following: 
MIKEL M. BOLEY 
Attorney for Plaintiff 
3535 South 3200 West 
West Valley City, Utah 84119 
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APPENDIX I . 
MIKEL M. BOLEY 
Attorney for Plaintiff 
3535 South 3200 West 
West Valley City, Utah 84119 
Telephone: 968-3501 or 968-8282 
CIRCUIT COURT, STATE OF UTAH 
SALT LAKE COUNTY, MURRAY DEPARTMENT 
FORD CONSUMER FINANCE, 
a Corporation, 
Plaintiff, t SUMMONS 
(Three-Day) 
vs. 
GARY SALAZAR, MRS. GARY SALAZAR 
and JOHN OR JANE DOES #1-10, 
Defendants : Civil No. 
THE STATE OF UTAH TO THE ABOVE-NAMED DEFENDANTS: 
You are hereby summoned and required to file an answer in 
writing to the attached Complaint with the clerk of the above 
court, which is located at 5022 South State Street, Murray, Utah 
84107, a written answer to the attached complaint, and to serve 
upon or mail to the plaintiff's attorney at 3535 South 3200 West, 
West Valley City, Utah 84119 a copy of your answer within 3 days 
after service of this summons upon you. 
If you fail to so answer, judgment by default will be taken 
against you for the relief demanded in the complaint, which has 
been filed with the clerk of the above court and a copy of which 
is attached and herewith served upon you. 
DATE j fr fr. ^90-?..J:,jb5a*g** 
UPON 
SANDY P R H i 
OEPUTY 
-R . 
O R D E R 
It appearing to the Court that good cause exists therefor, 
and pursuant to statute, 
IT IS HEREBY ORDERED that the time to answer or otherwise 
plead to Plaintiff's Complaint in the above-entitled action shall 
be shortened to three (3) days from the date of service. 
DATED this 
' ^ *j day of 
^ 
,v^  
BY THE 
7 & 
1990 
Serve Defendant(s) at: 
1886 FOXMOOR CIRCLE 
SANDY UTAH 84092 
CIRCUIT COURT JUDSfi fj 
TH\?V 
MIKBL M. BOLEY (0375) 
Attorney for Plaintiff 
3535 South 3200 West 
West Valley City, Utah 84119 
968-3501 or 968-8282 
CIRCUIT COURT, STATE OF UTAH 
SALT LAKE COUNTY, MURRAY DEPARTMENT 
FORD CONSUMER FINANCE, 
a Corporation, 
P l a i n t i f f , i C O M P L A I N T 
vs. 
GARY SALAZAR, MRS.SALAZAR and 
JOHN OR JANE DOES #1-10, 
Defendants. * Civil No. 
For cause of action against Defendants, Plaintiff alleges 
as follows: 
1. That Defendants are residents of Salt Lake County, State 
of Utah; that the property in question is located in Salt Lake 
County, State of Utah; and that less than TEN THOUSAND DOLLARS 
($10,000.00) is at issue herein.. 
2. That the true names and capacities; whether individual, 
corporate, children, relatives, associates or otherwise; of 
Defendants Doe #1-10 are unknown to Plaintiff, who, therefore 
sues said Defendants by such fictitious names. Plaintiff will 
seek leave of the Court to amend this complaint and set forth 
said Defendants' true names when said have been ascertained. 
3. That on May 8, 1990, pursuant to a previously executed 
Deed of Trust and pursuant to Section 57-1-27, Utah Code 
Annotated, a Trustee's Sale was held as to the real property 
located at 1886 Foxmoor Circle, Sandy, Utah. 
4. That at said Trustee's Sale, Plaintiff purchased said 
real property and was granted a Trustee's Deed, which was later 
recorded in the office of the Salt Lake County Recorder. 
5. That as a result of said Trustee's Sale and Trustee's 
Deed, Plaintiff became the owner of said real property and 
Defendants became tenants at will of Plaintiff. 
6. That Defendants have retained occupancy in said real 
property to the present time but have not done so with the 
consent of Plaintiff, nor have Defendants paid any rentals to 
Plaintiff. 
7. That due to Defendants' refusal to vacate the premises 
in question, Plaintiff did cause to be served upon Defendants a 
Notice To Quit Premises. A true and correct copy of said Notice 
To Quit Premises is attached hereto as Exhibit "AH and hereby 
made a part hereof as if fully set forth. 
8. That Defendants still retain possession of said premises 
and are now in unlawful detention thereof. 
9. That the reasonable daily rental value of said premises 
is $35.00. 
10. That Plaintiff presently has a prospective buyer for 
the premises in question. 
11. That Defendants or some of Defendants have interferred 
with said sale and have refused to cooperate with Plaintiff and 
Plaintiff's agents regarding said sale. 
12. That Plaintiff reserves the right to amend this 
complaint in the event that said sale falls through due to 
actions of Defendants, resulting in a loss to Plaintiff. 
WHEREFORE, Plaintiff prays for judgment and relief against 
Defendants jointly and severally as follows: 
(a) For an Order granting to Plaintiff restitution and 
possession of the premises lcoated at 1886 Foxmoor Circle, Sandy, 
Utah 84092. 
(b) For Judgment against Defendants in the sum of $1330.00 
for the 38 days Defendants have held possession after sale and 
prior to service of this Notice to Quit and for the additional 
sum of $105.00 per day from the date of service of the Notice To 
Quit until Plaintiff actually retakes possession. 
(c) For Plaintiff's costs of Court herein incurred. 
(d) For such other and further relief as to the Court 
seems proper. 
DATED this 28th dav af June, /J99^-
~7?&LI /0. fid,.. 
MIKEL M. BOLEY - Bax No. fe375 
Attorney for Plaintiff J 
3535 South 3200 West 
West Valley City, Utah 84119 
Plaintiff's Address: 
3540 South 4000 West Suite 430 
West Valley City, Utah 84120 
OWNER'S NOTICE TO QUIT PREMISES 
TO: Gary Salazar and any other 
tenants in possession of 
1886 Foxmoor Circle 
Sandy/ Utah 84092 
UPON 
SANDY 
DEPUTY 
YOU ARE HEREBY NOTIFIED AND REQUIRED within ten (10) days 
after this Notice is served upon you to vacate the above-listed 
premises and to take all of your personal belongings with you. 
As you know, said premises are now the property of Ford 
Consumer Finance, who received title to said premises as a result 
of a sale held May 8, 1990. You no longer hold either title or any 
other legal claim to said premises. 
If you fail to vacate within the time set forth above, a 
lawsuit will be commenced against you in which Ford Consumer 
Finance will seek reasonable rentals from May 8, 1990 until the 
service of this Notice and for the recovery of treble (three times) 
rents for any days thereafter until you vacate the premises. 
DATED this 14th day of June, 1990 
MIKEL M. B0LEY T 
Attorney for Ford Consumer Finance 
3535 South 3200 West 
West Valley City, Utah 84119 
968-8282 or 968-3501 
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APPENDIX I I . 
?r: 
WESLEY SINE (2967) 
Attorney for Defendant 
647 W. No. Temple 
Salt Lake City, Utah 84116 
CIRCUIT COURT, STATE OF UTAH 
SALT LAKE COUNTY, MURRAY DEPARTMENT 
FORD CONSUMER FINANCE, 
a Corporation, + 
+ 
Plaint i f f , + 
- v s - X A N S W E R 
+ 
GARY SALAZAR, MRS, SALAZAR and + ^ 
JOHN OR JANE DOES # 1-10, + civil JNO. _7c. 
+ 
Defendants. + 
Comes now the Defendant and answers Plaintiff's allegations 
contained in his complaint, as follows: 
1. Defendant admits Plaintiff's paragraph number one. 
2. Defendant neither admits nor denies Plaintiff's paragraph 
number two. 
3. Defendant does not know for a fact that the actions contained 
in Plaintiff's paragraphs three, four and five took place. If they 
did, then Defendant denies that they were properly done under the law 
and that by subsequent acts has abbrogated the sell, in that Plaintiff's 
agent, Jerry Powers, mislead and misrepresented to Defendant Gary 
Salazar that he would stop the Sheriff Sale upon certain actions being 
fullfilled by Defendant Salazar. That while Salazar was conversing 
with and negoiating with Powers, the sell (supposedly) was accomplished. 
That said Plaintiff's agent Jerry Powers by fraud did keep Salazar 
away from the sell and did mislead same, thereby voiding said sell 
if it actually did go through.
 T h a t subsequently to the sell and to 
the notice to vacate the property, Plaintiff has accepted $15,000.00 
toward what is owed on the home and credited it towards the balance due. 
Therefore Defendant's deny paragraphs # Three, Four and Five. 
4. Defendant's admit that they have retained possession of the 
real property but deny that they have received proper notice to move 
from the property and alledge that Plaintiff's have received adequate 
fa/ids to cure what ever breach existed and that Plaintiff's have 
credited Defendants account for the amount owed. Therefore Defendant 
denies Plaintiff's paragraph numbers six, seven, and eight. 
5. Defendant's admit paragraph # 9, and denies paragraph #'s 
ten, eleven and twelve. 
WHEREFORE, Defendant's request that Plaintiff's Complaint be 
dismissed and for such judgment and relief as the court may deem 
proper under the premises. 
Dated this 9th day of Junly, 1990. 
Plaintiff's Address: 
647 West North Temple 
Salt Lake City, Utah 84116 
//?.jj ^ L 
WESLEY SINE Attorney for Defendants 
Telephone 801-364-5125 
647 W. North Temple 
Salt Lake City, Utah 84116 
STATE OF UTAH \ 
ss 
County of Salt Lake) 
Comes now Gary Salazar, after first being duly sworn and deposes 
and says that: 
1. On May 8, 1990, that he meet wilh Jerry Powers an:, agent 
and representative oi the Plaintiff who negoiated with him to put 
off the sale of the property that is a part of this lawsuit, and led 
him to believe that the Sale was put off until after the time was spent 
after which he said that it was now too late and the sale was done. 
2. That on or about the 27th day of June, 1990, he received a 
receipt from Ford Consumer Finance Company that $15,000.00*had been 
credited to his account for 1886 Foxmoor Cir, Sandy, Utah. This 
property being the property subject to the above lawsuit. 
3. That it is his belief that the plaintiff had by so accepting 
said payment reinstated his property. 
DATED this 9th day of July, 1990. 
SUBSCRIBED AND SWORN to before me this 9th day of July, 1990. 
See Exhibit A M<< ., 7 »'" — 
C'residing in 
T - 1 
NOTARY PUBLIC'residing in Salt 
Lake County, Utah Commission expires 
10-27-91 
EXHIBIT A 
aSfi^k 
3S40 S «4000 WEST SUITEM30 
iEST VALLEY CITY UT 84120 
DATE 0b/2t/10 
H 
OFFICE NO. Ofi-MM-0132 
ACCOUNT NO. 1QT100 
HOUARD D SHERWOOD 
Iflflb FOXHOOR CIR 
SANDY UT aMo^a 
FORD CONSUflER FINANCE 
COflPANY 
DATE RECEIVED 0b/2b/1Q 
DATE DUE 0 4 / 2 0 / ^ 0 
AflOUNT RECEIVED 1 5 , 0 0 0 . 0 0 
PRINCIPAL Af10UNT15,0aa.0a 
INTEREST OR 
LATE CHARGES PAID . 0 0 
NEW BALANCE 1 2 2 , 0 7 1 . ? t 
TUAfUk' V A I I C A O W A I I O o r r r A i t n i v i n r i i T 
APPENDIX I I I . 
MIKBL M. BOLEY (0375) 
Attorney for Plaintiff 
3535 South 3200 West 
West Valley City, Utah 84119 
968-8282 or 968-3501 
CIRCUIT COURT, STATE OF UTAH 
SALT LAKE COUNTY, MURRAY DEPARTMENT 
FORD CONSUMER FINANCE, 
a Corporation, 
Plaintiff, : FINDINGS OF FACT AND 
vs. CONCLUSIONS OF LAW 
GARY SALAZAR, PEGGY SALAZAR, 
GABE SALAZAR and CHAD SALAZAR, 
Defendants. : Civil No: 903007491CV 
JUDGE: MICHAEL K. BURTON 
The above-entitled cause came on regularly for trial before 
the Honorable Michael K. Burton, Circuit Court Judge, on the 6th 
day of September, 1990. Plaintiff was present through its agent, 
Gerald L. Powers, and represented by its attorney, Mikel M. 
Boley; Defendant Gary Salazar was present: Defendants Gary 
Salazar and Peggy Salazar were represented by their attorney, 
Wesley Sine. Prior to proceeding the Court did sign an order 
substituting "Peggy Salazar" for "Mrs. Gary Salazar" and adding 
Gabe Salazar and Chad Salazar as Defendants in place of the Doe 
Defendants, although the Court specifically held that the hearing 
would only affect the rights of Gabe Salazar and Chad Salazar to 
inhabit the premises and not allow for a money judgment against 
them. Witnesses were called, testimony was received, exhibits 
were presented into evidence; the cause was argued to the Court 
and thereafter submitted to the Court for consideration and 
decision. The Court being fully advised in the premises, and 
upon motion of Mikel M. Boley the Corut now makes the follov/ing 
Findings of Fact and Conclusions of Law: 
FINDINGS OF FACT 
1. That title to the premises located at 1886 Foxmoor 
Circle, Sandy, Salt Lake County, State of Utah, is in the name of 
Ford Consumer Finance, pursuant to a Trustee's Deed dated and 
recorded 5/8/90. 
2. That Defendants Salazar have no written claim to said 
premises, but claim an interest through a verbal agreement with 
Howard Sherwood, the previous owner of the premises. 
3. That Defendants Salazar have resided in said premises 
from 8/22/90 to the date of trial. 
4. That Plaintiff properly notified Defendants to quit the 
premises. 
5. That Plaintiff otherwise satisfied the statutory 
requirements of unlawful detainer regarding Defendants and the 
premises in question. 
6. That Defendant Gary Salazar did claim that he v/as either 
misled or fraudulently induced by Gerald Powers, Plaintiff's 
agent, on 5/8/90, not to attend a trustee's sale or to take other 
action. 
7. That Gerald Powers did not mislead or fraudulently 
induce Gary Salazar not to attend or not to take other action on 
5/8/90. 
8. That Defendants' claims in equity regarding the fairness 
of Plaintiff's actions were not sufficiently proven to justify th* 
Courts disallowance of the Trustee's Deed, although Plaintiff, 
through it attorney, did stipulate at the start of trial that the 
Court could so hold and rule, if the evidence so v/arranted. 
9. That Defendants at no time after the initiation of the 
foreclosure action, which was done by the filing of a Notice of 
Default on 4/28/89, ever brought the account of Howard Sherwood 
with Plaintiff current. 
10. That a reasonable rental of the premises is $35.00 per 
day. 
11. That Plaintiff is entitled to a judgment against 
Defendants Gary Salazar and Peggy Salazar for $715.00 for the 49 
days from 5/8/90 (the date of Plaintiff's ownership) and 6/26/90 
(which is 11 days after Defendants were served with a Notice to 
Quit Premises) based upon $35.00 per day. 
12. That Plaintiff is entitled to a judgment against 
Defendants Gary Salazar and Peggy Salazar in the sum of $7455.00 
for the 71 days from 6/27/90 to 9/6/90, based upon treble damages 
of $105.00 per day, plus $105.00 per day until the premises are 
vacated by Defendants. 
13. That Plaintiff is entitled to a judgment against 
Defendants Gary Salazar and Peggy Salazar in the sum of $74.75 as 
court costs. 
14. That Plaintiff is entitled to a judgment of restitution 
against all Defendants. 
Based upon the foregoing Findings of Fact the Court hereby 
makes the following: 
CONCLUSIONS 0£ LAW 
1. Plaintiff is the owner of the premises located at 1886 
Foxmoor Circle, Sandy, Salt Lake County, State of Utah, pursuant 
to a Trustee's Deed. 
2. Defendants have been tenants at will of Plaintiff since 
5/8/90. 
3. Plaintiff properly followed statutory requirements to 
evict Defendants from the premises. 
4. Defendants are in unlawful detention of the premises. 
5. Plaintiff is entitled to a writ of restitution removing 
all Defendants and their belongings from the premises. 
6. Plaintiff is entitled to a judgment against Defendants 
Gary Salazar and Peggy Salazar in the sum of $9170.00, plus court 
costs of $74.75, plus $105.00 per day for any days after 9/6/90, 
that Defendants remain in the premises. 
DATED this day of 1990. 
BY THE COURT: 
CIRCUIT COURT JUDGE 
MAILING CERTIFICATE 
I hereby certify that I mailed a true and correct copy of 
the foregoing FINDINGS OF FACT AND CONCLUSIONS OF LAW, postage 
prepaid, this 7th day of September, 1990, addressed as follows: 
WESLEY SINE, ESQ. 647 WEST NORTH TEMPLE 
SALT LAKE CITY, UTAH 84116 
11IKEL 11. BOLEY 
Attorney for Plaintiff 
APPENDIX IV. 
MIKEL M. BOLEY (0375) 
Attorney for Plaintiff 
3535 South 3200 West 
West Valley City, Utah 84119 
968-8282 or 968-3501 
CIRCUIT COURT, STATE OF UTAH 
SALT LAKE COUNTY, MURRAY DEPARTMENT 
FORD CONSUMER FINANCE, 
a Corporation, 
Plaintiff, JUDGMENT, JUDGMENT FOR 
vs. RESTITUTION OF PREMISES, 
AND DECLARING FORFEITURE 
GARY SALAZAR, PEGGY SALAZAR, OF TENANCY 
GABE SALAZAR and CHAD SALAZAR 
Defendants. Civil No: 903007491CV 
JUDGE: MICHAEL K. BURTON 
The above-entitled cause came on regularly for trial before 
the Honorable Michael K. Burton, Circuit Court Judge, on the 6th 
day of September, 1990. Plaintiff was present through its agent, 
Gerald L. Powers, and represented by its attorney, Mikel 11. 
Boley; Defendant Gary Salazar was present; Defendants Gary 
Salazar and Peggy Salazar were represented by their attorney 
Wesley Sine. Prior to proceeding the Court did sign an order 
substituting "Peggy Salazar" for "Mrs. Gary Salazar" and adding 
Gabe Salazar and Chad Salazar as Defendants in place of the Doe 
Defendants, although the Court specifically held that the hearing 
would only affect the rights of Gabe Salazar and Chad Salazar to 
inhabit the premises and not allow for a money judgment against 
them. Witnesses were called, testimony was received, exhibits 
were presented into evidence; the cause was argued to the Court 
and thereafter submitted to the Court for consideration and 
decision. The Court being fully advised in the premises, having 
previously made and entered its Findings of Fact and Conclusions 
of Law, now upon Motion of Mikel M. Boley, it is hereby 
ORDERED, ADJUDGED AND DECREED: that Plaintiff Ford Consumer 
Finance do have and is hereby granted judgment against Defendants 
as follows: 
1. That Plaintiff do have and recover judgment from the 
Defendants Gary Salazar and Peggy Salazar in the sum of NINE 
THOUSAND ONE HUNDRED SEVENTY AND NO/100 DOLLARS ($9,170.00) for 
regular rental and treble damages through 9/6/90. 
2. That Plaintiff do have and recover judgment from 
Defendants Gary Salazar and Peggy Salazar for treble rent in the 
sum of ONE HUNDRED FIVE AND NO/100 DOLLARS ($105.00) per day from 
9/6/90 per day until Defendants vacate said premises. 
3. That all Defendants are guilty of unlawful detainer of 
the premises at 1886 Foxmoor Circle, Sandy, Salt Lake County, 
Utah, and that a writ of restitution issue therefore forthwith 
and that any interest of Defendants to lease or tenant said 
premises be and the same is hereby forfeited and terminated. 
DATED this day of 1990. 
BY THE COURT: 
CIRCUIT COURT JUDGE 
MAILING CERTIFICATE 
I hereby certify that I mailed a true and correct copy of 
the foregoing JUDGMENT, JUDGMENT FOR RESTITUTIONOF PREMISES, AND 
DECLARING FORFEITURE OF TENANCY, postage prepaid, this 7th day of 
September, 1990, addressed as follows: 
WESLEY SINE, ESQ 647 WEST NORTH TEMPLE 
SALT LAKE CITY, UTAH 84116 
>^y ^ << 
MIKEL M. BOLEY 
Attorney for Plaintiff 
APPENDIX V. 
ttJKEL M. BOLEY (037 5) 
Attorney for Ford Consumer Finance 
3535 South 3200 West 
West V a l l e y C i t y , Utah 84119 OFFICE OF JUDGE 
968-8232 or 963-3501 GLfcN £ CLARK 
IN THE UNITED STATES BANKRUPTCY COURT FOR THE DISTRICT OF UTAH 
CENTRAL DIVISION 
I n r e : 
GARY CURTIS SALA2AR 
and PEGGY COON SALAZAR 
Debtors. ORDER GRANTING RELIEF 
FROli AUTOMATIC STAY 
Bankruptcy No: 90C-O5730 
Chapter 13 
The Ex. Parte iiotion For Relief From Automatic Stay of Ford 
Consumer Finance came before the Honorable Glen E . Clark, 
Bankruptcy Court Judge in his chambers on September 25, 1990. 
Based upon the verified motion, for good cause shov/n and upon 
motion of Mikel M. Boley, it is hereby 
ORDERED, that the Automatic Stay is hereby partially lifted 
as follows: Ford Consumer Finance shall be entitled to proceed 
with its eviction proceedings seeking the restitution of the 
following real property located in Salt Lake County, State of 
Utah: 
Lot 62, BRANDON PARK NO. 1, as recorded in the official 
plat thereof in the Salt Lake County Recorder's Office 
DATED this 2. f~ d aY of Sept ember, 1990. 
BY THE COURT 
sreby certify that the annexed and foregoipdZ X y ^ V ^ ^/ 
\ true and complete copy of a documcnfofL * -£^< ^ f S^/fr*-^ 
— ww...K,*,lo «-w^ /y ui d document on. -"- ^ ^ w '^—'—«v i*/ 
m the United States ' Bankruptcy 5 o u r F P T C Y C 0 U R T J U D G * 
the District o t U t a h f - r — - Z. o 9-
Dated: %-& ^ - ' ^ .^n^V^ nut™***' 
Attest: :. . . ^ . . . . g , n /SJC / ^ c ^ c * - & * v * 
D e D U t v ' O f k — " ~ ~ SANDY P f E C J M l , ^ ^ COUNTY. UTAH 
WESLEY SINE (2967) 
Attorney for Defendant 
647 West North Temple 
Salt Lake City, Utah 84116 
Telephone (801) 3645125 
CIRCUIT COURT, STATE OF UTAH 
SALT LAKE COUNTY, MURRAY DEPARTMENT 
FORD CONSUMER FINANCE, 
a corporation, 
Plaintiff, 
vs. 
GARY SALAZAR, PEGGY SALAZAR, 
GABE SALAZAR and CHAD SALAZAR, 
Defendants. 
Notice is hereby given that GARY SALAZAR, PEGGY SALAZAR, GABE 
SALAZAR, AND CHAD SALAZAR, Defendants above named, hereby appeal 
to the COURT OF APPEALS OF THE STATE OF UTAH from the Judgment, 
Judgment for Restitution of premises, and Declaring Forfeiture 
of Tenancy entered in this action on September 10, 1990 in the 
Circuit Court, Salt Lake County (Murray Division), 
/^WESXEYSINE 17' 
Attorney for Appellant 
647 West North Temple 
Salt Lake City, Utah 84116 
NOTICE OF APPEAL 
Civil # 903007491 CV 
APPENDIX V I . 
I::PT: >:. BOLEY (0375) 
At* .r.-y for Plaintiff 
"
r
 * r uth 3200 West 
\;~ "alley City, Utah 84119 
?•: " " !£2 or 968-3501 
CIRCUIT COURT, STATE OF UTAH 
SALT LAKE COUNTY, MURRAY DEPARTMENT 
FORD CONSUMER FINANCE, 
a Corporation, 
Plaintiff, : FINDINGS OF FACT AND 
CONCLUSIONS OF LAW 
v. 
GARY SALAZAR, PEGGY SALAZAR, 
GABE SALAZAR and CHAD SALAZAR, 
Defendants. : Civil No: 903007491CV 
JUDGE: MICHAEL K. BURTON 
Plaintiff's Motion to Strike Appeal came on for hearing and 
disposition 10/1/90, before the Honorable Michael K. Burton, 
Circuit Court Judge. Plaintiff was represented by its attorney, 
Mikel M. Boley. Defendants were represented by their attorney, 
Wesley Sine. The cause was argued to the Court, which was fully 
advised in the premises. Whereupon, for good cause shown and 
upon motion of Mikel M. Boley, the Court does hereby make and 
enter the following 
FINDINGS OF FACT 
1. The pending action was based completely in unlawful 
detainer and not partially upon some other theory or basis. 
2. Defendants did not file their appeal within ten (10) 
days of either the date of entry of judgment or of notice to 
Defendants of entry of judgment. 
3, In the event that Defer:1.-:: 5 should appeal this rul:r^ 
and ultimate]y succeed in havir; :h*ir previously filed av
 : " " 
heard, and should Defendants prevail on said appeal, and should 
an higher Court order that Defendants can move back into th~ 
premises in quesion, Plaintiff should pay for the costs »nd 
expenses reasonably incurred by Defendants in moving out and in 
moving back into said premises. 
4, Defendants must vacate the premises no later than 12:OC 
Noon on or about 10/5/90, whether or not this ruling is appealed. 
5, Should Defendants appeal this ruling, there will be no 
stay of proceeding nor will a Supersedeas bond be accepted. 
Based upon the foregoing Findings of Fact the Court now 
enters the following 
CONCLUSIONS OF. LAW 
1. Defendants were attempting to appeal the judgment in 
this unlawful detainer but did not do so within ten (10) days. 
2. Defendants' failure to file an appeal within ten (10} 
days is jurisdictional, and the appeal cannot take place. 
3. Defendants' appeal should be denied and sticken. 
4. To protect Defendants in the event they appeal this 
decision and in the event they prevail on their original appeal 
and are allowed to re-occupy the premises in question, Defendants 
should file a $10,000.00 bond to cover Defendants' expenses in 
moving out and back into the premises. 
5. I r: *. ;r'iints are ordered to v^  . -t.t ti ie premises n 
than j?:Cr Kc.n on 10/5/90, whethe: r not this I U 1 ; 
appealed. 
6. There shall ther stay or proceedings ,: 
matter, v;hether Defendants appeal or not. 
• ater 
r. 2 is 
this 
DATED this day of October, 1990, 
BY THE COURT: 
f^UJx^rL^ 
CIRCU 
MAILING CERTIFICATE 
hereby certify that I mailed a true and correct copy of 
the foregoing FINDINGS OF FACT AND CONCLUSIONS OF LAV/, postage 
prepaid, this 2nd day of October, 1990, addressed as follows: 
WESLEY SINE, ESQ. 647 WEST NORTH TEHPLE 
SALT LAKE CITY, UTAH 84116 
MIKEL H. B O L E Y V 
Attorney for Plaintiff 
3535 South 3200 West 
West Valley City, Utah 84119 
968-8282 or 968-3501 
1IIKEL I!. BOLEY (0375 , 
Attorney for Plaintiff 
2525 South 2200 West 
'Jest Valley City, Utah 34119 
9b.c-82£l or 96G-2501 
CIRCUIT COURT. STATE OF UTAH 
SALT LAKE COUNTY, HURRAY DEPARTMENT 
FORD CONSUMER FINANCE, 
a Corporation. 
Plaintiff, ORDER STRIKING 
DEFENDANTS AFFEAL 
GARY SALAZAR, PEGGY SALAZAR, 
GABE SALAZAR and CHAD SALAZAR, 
Defendants. Civil No: 902007491CV 
JUDGE: MICHAEL K. BURTON 
Plaintiff's Motion To Strike Appeal came on for hearing and 
disposition on October 1, 1990. before the Honorable Michael K. 
Burton, Circuit Court Judge. Plaintiff was represented by its 
attorney, Mikel M. Boley. Defendants were represented by their 
attorney Uesley Sine. The matter was argued by the attorneys and 
submitted to the Court for its disposition. Whereupon, for good 
cause shown, based upon the failure of Defendants to appeal 
within ten days as required by Utah Code Section 78-36-11. and 
upon motion of llikel 11. Boley. it is hereby 
ORDERED, that Defendants' appeal be and is hereby stricken 
and denied. 
DATED this / day of October^ 
CIRCU 
APPENI 1 '- V I I . 
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The majority finds "no evidence whatso-
ever of a rigid or inflexible application of 
the in-person-contact requirement." To the 
contrary, the rigid syllogistic reasoning of 
the appeals referee is evident from the face 
of his written opinion. The referee only 
notes that Ms. Payotelis had been aware of 
the requirement to make at least two or 
three in-person contacts to prospective em-
ployers each week and that she had failed 
to meet this requirement between October 
3 and October 23. He then summarily con-
cludes that she had not met the eligibility 
requirements of the Department of Em-
ployment Security for three weeks in Octo-
ber. No analysis of Ms. Payotelis' particu-
lar circumstances and no response to her 
attorney's arguments are contained in the 
referee's written decision. The language 
of the referee's opinion quoted by the ma-
jority refers only to the period after No-
vember 28 and is not applicable to the 
earlier period. 
I would overrule the Department's deci-
sion denying benefits from October 3, 1982, 
through October 23, 1982, and eliminate 
the resulting assessment of an overpay-
ment. There may be some special merit to 
an in-person contact as opposed to a phone 
call, and I do not question the expertise of 
the Department of Employment Security in 
this respect. However, it does appear from 
the facts of this case that Ms. Payotelis, 
based on her experience in the business, 
intelligently and prudently conserved her 
resources by calling ahead to discover 
whether a personal visit would prove 
worthwhile. I can see little sense in re-
fusing to allow the use of the telephone in 
those cases where it is appropriate and 
instead requiring people of limited means 
to knowingly waste their last dollars on 
certainly futile personal contacts. If the 
Department has some reason for requiring 
this, it should state it in the context of 
these facts. The opinion of the appeals 
referee is a mechanical application of a 
requirement that in this case has been 
shown to be irrelevant and futile. I would 
reverse. 
FASHIONS FOUR CORPORATION, a 
Utah corporation, and Elgin Williams, 
Plaintiffs and Respondents, 
v. 
FASHION PLACE ASSOCIATES, a linv 
ited partnership, and Bob Garwood, 
Defendants and Appellants. 
No. 18194. 
Supreme Court of Utah. 
April 18, 1984. 
Lessor appealed from a judgment of 
the Third District Court, Salt Lake County, 
David B. Dee, J., enjoining it from interfer-
ing with lessee's possession of premises. 
The Supreme Court, Howe, J., held that 
reassignment of lease by assignee back to 
original lessee under unexpired lease did 
not require consent of lessor under lease 
requiring consent of lessor to transfer or 
assignment of rights to third persons. 
Affirmed. 
1. Appeal and Error <5»351(1) 
Where lessee's complaint against les-
sor contained four causes of action, includ-
ing claims for forcible entry and detainer 
and damages for breach of the lease, ap-
peal from order awarding general damages 
to lessee was not governed by statute re-
quiring appeal to be filed within ten days 
from date of entry of judgment for forcible 
entry and detainer. U.C.A.1953, 78-36-10, 
78-36-11; Rules Civ.Proc, Rule 73(a). 
2. Landlord and Tenant <s=79(l) 
Upon assignment, privity of estate ter-
minates between lessor and lessee and 
arises between lessor and assignee; how-
ever, privity of contract between lessor and 
lessee continues until expiration of the 
lease. 
3. Landlord and Tenant <s=>75(3) 
Assignment of lease back to original 
lessee is excepted from rule that assign-
FASHIONS FOUR v. FASHION PLACE ASSOCIATES 
CUeas6Sl P.2d830 (Utah t984) 
Utah 831 
ment without consent of lessor confers no 
rights upon assignee. 
4. Landlord and Tenant «»76(3) 
Reassignment of lease by assignee 
back to original lessee under unexpired 
lease did not require consent of lessor un-
der lease requiring consent of lessor to 
transfer or assignment of rights to third 
persons. 
Raymond Scott Berry, Salt Lake City, for 
defendants and appellants. 
E.H. Fankhauser, Salt Lake City, for 
plaintiffs and respondents. 
HOWE, Justice: 
This appeal involves the reassignment of 
a lease that had been entered into between 
plaintiff, Fashions Four Corporation (Fash-
ions Four), as lessee, and defendant Fash-
ion Place Associates (Fashion Place), as 
lessor. 
Fashion Place was the lessor and Fash-
ions Four was the lessee under a ten-year 
lease dated May 6, 1974, for premises at 
the Fashion Place Mall, commercially 
known as "Charlie's." Article 15 of the 
lease provided for the lessor's written con-
sent to any assignment by the lessee. In 
September of 1978, Fashions Four assigned 
its lease to Norsal Development Corpora-
tion. Fashion Place consented. In Novem-
ber of 1979, ownership of Norsal was ac-
quired by one Neil Davidson, who contin-
ued the operation of Charlie's without any 
objection by Fashion Place. By June of 
1981, the business had failed, Davidson 
was delinquent in rent, the inventory of 
Charlie's had been attached, and a sheriffs 
sale was scheduled to satisfy creditors. 
Davidson negotiated with Fashions Four 
for the repossession of the premises and 
the reassignment of the lease to Fashions 
Four. Fashion Place changed the locks on 
June 19 and denied Fashions Four access to 
toe premises on the ground that Fashion 
'
acJ^had not consented to the reassign-
^ejrbf the lease. Fashions Four obtained 
* temporary restraining order against 
pashion Place, which put it back into pos-
session pending the outcome of the trial. 
The trial court awarded Fashions Four 
damages and attorney fees and permanent-
ly enjoined Fashion Place from interfering 
with Fashions Four's possession of the 
premises under the terms of the lease. 
Fashion Place appeals, contending that 
as a matter of law the reassignment of the 
lease from Davidson to Fashions Four was 
without force and effect because it had not 
given its consent under Article 15. Fash-
ions Four also claims that this Court is 
without jurisdiction to hear this appeal in-
asmuch as Fashion Place failed to file its 
appeal within ten days from the date of 
entry of judgment for forcible entry and 
detainer as required by U.C.A., 1953, 
§ 78-36-11. We first address this thresh-
old issue. 
[1] Fashions Four's verified complaint 
contained four causes of action, asking for 
treble damages for forcible entry and de-
tainer under the first two causes of action, 
a temporary restraining order and tempo-
rary injunction under the third, and dam-
ages for breach of the lease under the 
fourth. Fashion Place filed its counter-
claim, likewise containing four causes of 
action, asserting wrongful reoccupation by 
Fashions Four, asking for declaratory re-
lief in striking the temporary restraining 
order, as well as for an expedited trial 
setting. The remedy for forcible entry and 
detainer is treble damages and restitution 
of premises. U.C.A., 1953, § 78-36-10. 
Conversely, judgment was entered in favor 
of Fashions Four for general damages 
only, a permanent injunction and a dismiss-
al with prejudice of Fashion Place's coun-
terclaim. Consequently, we are compelled 
to conclude that the hybrid nature of plain-
tiffs action, containing additional declara-
tory and equitable causes, and of the de-
fendant's counterclaim with similar causes, 
prevents § 78-36-11 from controlling the 
time for appeal. Belnap v. Fox, et ai, 69 
Utah 15, 251 P. 1073 (1927); Dunbar, et at. 
v. Hanson, et ai, 68 Utah 398, 250 P. 982 
(1926); Oppenheimer, et ai v. Mountain 
States Supply Co., 56 Utah 190. 188 P. 
1117 (1920). Instead, the appeal is gov-
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erned by Utah R Civ P 73(a) and was 
therefore perfected tn timely fashion We 
proceed to the merits of the case 
The central issue to be decided here is 
whether the lessor's consent in writing is 
necessary before an assignee may assign a 
lease back to the original lessee for the 
unexpired term of the lease This is a case 
of first impression in our forum 
Article 15 of the lease agreement pro-
vides in pertinent part as follows 
The tenant shall not transfer, assign, 
sublet this Lease or the tenant's in-
terest in and to the premises without 
first procuring the written consent of the 
landlord Any attempted transfer, as-
signment, subletting without the 
landlord's written consent shall be void 
and confer no rights upon any third per-
son [Emphasis ours ] 
Article 35 G provides m pertinent part 
Landlord's consent to or approval of 
any act by tenant requiring landlord's 
consent or approval shall not be deemed 
to waive or render unnecessary land-
lord's consent to or approval of any sub-
sequent similar act by tenant 
Fashion Place contends that, construing 
these articles m harmony, its consent to the 
earlier assignment did not operate to waive 
a subsequent required consent Fashion 
Place buttresses this argument by invoking 
public policy considerations and pointing to 
the intent of the parties under contractual 
provisions Specifically, Fashion Place ar-
gues that the consent to assignment provi-
sion is designed to serve two purposes, one, 
to reject contractually the common law rule 
that leaseholds are freely assignable, and 
two, and more importantly, to insure that 
the lessor has a responsible tenant to look 
to for performance of the lease From that 
thesis Fashion Place then derives its con-
clusion that once the original lessee assigns 
its lease to an assignee, the lessor must 
have the opportunity to pass on the qualifi-
cations of all potential tenants, including 
those of the original tenant under the unex 
pired lease We disagree 
[2,3) The language of Article 15 clearly 
states the parties' objectives m requiring 
the lessor's consent to assignment Unless 
that consent is given, no rights are con-
ferred upon third persons We agree with 
Fashion Place that the assignment or trans-
fer of a lease interest by a tenant is of 
critical importance to a lessor of an en-
closed shopping mall and that its consent 
gives it the requisite control to create the 
optimum commercial environment for all 
mall tenants However, once certain rights 
have been conferred upon the lessee, those 
rights may not be vitiated absent a breach 
of covenant by the lessee Only the rights 
of assignees of the lessee may be defeated 
bv an assignment without consent The 
purport of the contractual language is 
clear It expressly excepts from the con-
sent to assignment an assignment back to 
the original lessee who does not qualify as 
a third person under the terms of the lease 
in which he is a contracting party Upon 
assignment pnvitv of estate terminates be-
tween lessor and lessee and arises between 
lessor and assignee However, pnvity of 
contract between the lessor and the lessee 
continues until the expiration of the lease 
Broida v Hayashi, 51 Hawaii 493, 464 
P 2d 285 (1970) It follows that an assign-
ment back to the original lessee is excepted 
from the rule that an assignment without 
consent of lessor confers no rights upon 
the assignee \bsent a release by the les-
sor, the original lessee remains ''able for 
the performance by its assignee of the cov-
enant to pav rent Kintner v Harr, 146 
Mont 461, 408 P 2d 487 (1965) Where 
that burden persists, the concomitant bene-
fit should likewise obtain, allowing the les-
see to step into the shoes of the assignee 
whose performance has been placed in jeop-
ardy The rationale for the exception has 
been stated as follows 
The covenant by the lessee, that he or 
others having his estate in the premises 
will not assign this lease without the 
written consent of the lessor, does not bv 
its true construction extend so far as to 
prohibit a reassignment to the lessee 
himself without a new and special con 
sent of the lessor By the lease itself, 
STATE v 
Clte«6«l PJd 
the lessor consents to take the lessee as 
his tenant for the full term mentioned m 
the lease This consent is available for 
any reassignment to the original lessee 
during the term There is therefore no 
breach of the covenant The statement 
that the reassignment has never been 
consented to, means only that no special 
consent has been given, and this is un-
necessary 
G Thompson, Thompson on Real Property 
(1981 Replacement) Volume 3A 9 l2i3, cit-
ing McCormick v Stouell, 138 Massachu-
setts 431, 433-34 (1885), see also Coulos v 
Desiynone, 34 Wash 2d 87, 208 P 2d 105 
(1949) 
[4] We hold that the assignment by 
Davidson back to Fashions Four as the 
original lessee under the unexpired lease 
was not contingent upon the consent of 
Fashion Place and that the trial court prop-
erly reinstated Fashions Four in the lease 
hold premises The judgment below is af-
firmed with costs awarded to Fashions 
Four 
HALL, C J , and STEWART, OAKS and 
DURHAM, JJ, concur 
NEWTON Utah 833 
833 (Utah 1984) 
held that refusal to give a proffered in-
struction stressing the special pitfalls of 
eyewitness identification was not prejudi-
cial error where the witness, who had 
about three minutes to observe the un-
masked defendant, most of the time at a 
close range and in a store that was well 
illuminated, was positive in her identifica-
tion 
Affirmed 
Durham, J , concurred in the result 
and filed opinion in which Stewart, J , con-
curred 
Criminal Law <s»1173 2(5) 
Refusal to give a proffered instruction 
stressing the special pitfalls of eyewitness 
identification was not prejudicial error 
where the witness, who had about three 
minutes to observe the unmasked defend-
ant, most of the time at a close range and 
in a store that was well illuminated, was 
positive in her identification 
IlTNUMItXVriltM ^niuO 
Bradley P Rich, Salt Lake City, for de-
fendant and appellant 
David L Wilkinson, Atty Gen, J. Ste-
phen MiWtta, Asst Atty Gen, James F. 
Housley, Deputy Salt Lake County Atty, 
Salt Lake City, for plaintiff and respon-
dent 
STATE of Utah, Plaintiff and 
Respondent, 
v. 
Jay Richard NEWTON, Defendant 
and Appellant. 
No. 19065. 
Supreme Court of Utah 
April 23, 1984 
Defendant was convicted m the Third 
District Court, Salt Lake County, Dennis 
Fredrick, J , of aggravated robbery, and he 
a p a l e d The Supreme Court, Oaks, J , 
OAKS, Justice. 
A jury convicted defendant ot aggrava-
ted robbery U C A , 1953, § 76-6-302 
The only evidence linking defendant to the 
crime was the eyewitness identification of 
the victim On appeal, defendant claims 
that the trial court committed prejudicial 
error by refusing his proffered instruction 
stressing the special pitfalls of eyewitness 
identification See United States v Tel-
/aire, 469 F 2d 552 (D C Cir 1972) We af-
firm 
During the morning of May 6, 1981, San-
dra Shephard, a registered pharmacist with 
22 years' experience, was working at Salt 
Lake Drug East She saw a man enter the 
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Counsel call attention to the principle that, if a party de-
taining property did not use same, the deterioration which 
it would have suffered \ v use as the owner would have used 
it must be deducted from the value of the use, and that in 
this case no deduction was made because of deterioration. 
This issue was not raised by defendant's answer. No in-
struction was requested upon the subject, and in no way* 
is the question before us for review. It is apparent that in 
the trial court appellant relied wholly upon his contention 
that in replevin when the value of the property is fixed at 
the time of the taking the damages may not exceed the interest 
on such value, and thus relying upon that theory of the case, 
counsel logically perceived no reason for raising an issue 
which they thought immaterial. 
The record discloses no prejudicial error. 
The judgment is therefore affirmed, with costs to 
respondent. 
CORFMAN, C. J., and FRICK, GIDEON, and THUR-
MAN, JJ., concur. 
OTTENHEIMER et al v. MOUNTAIN STATES 
SUPPLY CO. 
No. 3419. Decided March 30, 1920. Rehearing denied April 24, 
1920. (188 Pac. 1117.) 
1. APPEAL AND ERBOB—RESPONDENTS NOT ENTITLED TO ASSERT AP-
PEAL WAS NOT TAKEN IN TIME. In an action in which the first 
count sought recovery of real property and the second count 
asked that plaintiff's title to an adjoining strip be quieted, 
where the case was tried and submitted and determined as an 
action in equity, plaintiffs could not assert that it was other 
than one in equity, as the basis for a motion to dismiss the 
appeal, because not taken in time, though the relief prayed for 
in the first cause of action could have been recovered in an 
action of forcible detainer. 
2. APPEAL AND ERROR—ACCEPTANCE OF BENEFITS OR ACQUIESCENCE 
IN JUDGMENT DEFEATS APPEAL. A party to an action accepting 
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the benefit of a judgment in his favor or acquiescing in a judg-
ment against him thereby waives his right to have the judg-
ment reviewed on appeal. 
3. APPEAL AND ERROR—SURRENDER OP POSSESSION OF PBOPEBTT IN 
DISPUTE HELD TO PREVENT REVIEW. In an action to recover pos-
session of land and quiet title and to recover the reasonable 
rental value, defended on the ground that defendant had a lease 
at a rental less than the alleged reasonable rental and having 
some time to run, defendant's surrender of the premises after an 
adverse judgment prevented an appeal by it, as it thereby 
abandoned its contention that it had a lease and escaped lia-
bility for the rent for the rest of the claimed term. 
Appeal from District Court, Third District, Salt Lake 
County; P. C. Evans, Judge. 
Action by Albert Ottenheimer and others against the 
Mountain States Supply Company. 
From a judgment for plaintiffs, defendant appeals. On 
motion to dismiss appeal. 
APPEAL DISMISSED. 
C. E. Norton, of Salt Lake City, for appellant, 
F. C. Loofbourow and Dey, Hoppaugh <& Mark, all of Salt jake City, for respondents. 
FRICK, J. 
Two causes of action are stated in the complaint. In the 
rst one plaintiffs seek to recover possession of certain real 
roperty, describing it, the possession of which, it is alleged, 
wrongfully withheld from the plaintiffs by the defendant, 
id for damages for withholding the same. In the second 
use of action plaintiffs seek to quiet title to a certain strip 
ground which adjoins the property involved in the first 
use of action, and it is asked that the defendant be re-
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quired to set forth its claim, if any it has. The defendant, 
in its answer to the complaint, denied the allegations of the 
complaint, and, as an affirmative defense, alleged that it held 
the property in question by virtue of a lease which u had 
obiained from plaintiffs' grantors by the terms of which it 
was entitled to the possession of the premises in question at 
a specified rental for a fixed period of time which would not 
expire for several years. By way of counterclaim it further 
alleged that pursuant to the terms of the lease it had made 
improvements and betterments on the devised premises to the 
value of $2,000. It prayed that the plaintiffs' action be dis-
missed; that it be adjudged that the defendant has a valid 
lease upon the premises aforesaid under which it is entitled to 
possession thereof until May 1, 1923, and that it recover the 
value of said alleged improvements. The plaintiffs, in their 
reply, denied the material averments of the answer and coun-
terclaim, and mure fully explained the reasons why the de-
fendant is not entitled to the possession of the aforesaid 
property. 
A trial to the court resulted in findings of fact and con-
clusions of law m favor of the plaintiffs upon which a judg-
ment was entered from which the defendant appeals and 
assigns numerous errors. 
We are met at the threshold with a motion by plaintiffs 
to dismiss the appeal upon the ground that it was not taken 
within the time required by our statute. The motion is based 
upon the contention that the action is one of forcible de-
tainer under our statute (Comp. Laws Utah, 1917, sections 
1713 to 1727, inclusive, and hence that an appeal must be 
taken within the time therein specified, which is within ten 
days after judgment. While it is true that the relief prayed 
for in the first cause of action might have been had in a pro-
ceeding of forcible detainer, yet it is also true that the relief 
sought and obtained by plaintiffs under the second cause of 
action is purely equitable, and could not have been had ia 
a forcible detainer action under our statute. Moreover, the 
case was tried throughout and submitted to the court, and by 
it determined, as an action in equity. The plaintiffs, 
therefore, in order to defeat the appeal, may not now 1 
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be heard to say that the action was other than one in 
equity. There is no merit to the motion to dismiss the appeal 
upon the ground stated therein, and hence the motion should 
be, and it accordingly is, denied. 
Some time after the cause was submitted on the appeal 
plaintiffs' counsel made application to this court for leave to 
file another motion to dismiss the appeai upon the ground 
that the defendant had abandoned its appeal, and hence had 
waived its right to have the judgment reviewed by this court. 
That motion is grounded upon the following proceedings: 
The judgment, or decree as it is designated in the record, 
awarded plaintiffs the possession of the property mentioned in 
the first cause of action, and also awarded them the sum of 
$2,400 "damages • # • for withholding the possession 
of said premises." The court also quieted the title to the strip 
of property before referred to and described in the complaint 
of plaintiffs, and* awarded them costs. The defendant ap-
pealed from the judgment "and from the whole thereof." 
After the cause had" been submitted the defendant served 
notice upon plaintiffs' counsel as follows: 
"To the Plaintiffs and Their Attorneys: Please take notice that 
pursuant to your notice to vacate and the order of said court re-
quiring said defendant to vacate the premises described in the 
complaint in the above-entitled action the defendant has vacated 
said premises and here delivers possession thereof without waiving 
any of its claims against said plaintiffs, or against the Zion's Sav-
ings Bank & Trust Company, or against the City Trust & Investment 
Company, or against any of them, by reason of being required to 
vacate said premises contrary to the terms of the said leases named 
and set forth in its answer and counterclaim herein." 
Immediately upon serving that notice plaintiffs' counsel 
asked and obtained leave to file the additional motion to dis-
miss the appeal before referred to. 
It is elementary that in case a party to an action accepts 
the benefits of a judgment in his favor or acquiesces in a 
judgment against him he thereby waives his right to have 
8aid judgment reviewed on appeal. 2 Cyc. 644; 3 C. J. p. 
665, section 536. In the same volume of Cyc, at page 556, 
it is said: 
Any act on the part of a defendant by which he impliedly recog-
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nizes the validity of a judgment against him operates as a waiver 
of hia rights to appeal therefrom or bring error to reverse It.'* 
In 2 Ency. PL & Pr., at page 174, the rule is stated thus: 
"It is a settled doctrine that where a party recovering a judgment 
or decree accepts the benefits thereof, voluntarily and knowing the 
facts, he is estopped to afterwards reverse the Judgment or decree 
on error The acceptance operates as and may be pleaded as a 
release of error." 
See, also, Elwert v. Marleij, 53 Or. 591, 99 Pac. 887, 101 
Pac. 671, 133 Am. St. Rep. 850; Male v. Harlan, 12 S. D. 627, 
82 N. W. 179, and Sheldon v. Hotter, 59 Kan. 776, 53 Pac. 
127.1 
Counsel for the defendant does not dispute or question 
the rule as stated in the foregoing citations, and hence 
it is not necessary to pursue the subject further. 2 
The question, therefore, is, Does this case come 
within the rule? As we have seen, the principal question 
that was litigated was whether the defendant had a lease to 
the premises under which it was entitled to hold possession? 
The court found that it had no lease, and therefore con-
tinued in possession without authority or law and against 
the consent of the plaintiffs, the owners. The further 
question as to whether the plaintiffs were entitled to re-
cover the sum of $500 a month for the use of the premises, 
or were limited to the sum of $350 a month, the amount 
that it is contended was specified in the alleged lease, entirely, 
depended upon whether the defendant had the alleged lease 
or not. The court found that there was no lease, and hence 
found that the amount that defendant should pay was not 
fixed by any contract, and therefore it should be required to 
pay the reasonable rental value of the premises, which was 
$500 a month. In voluntarily surrendering the premises upon 
which it claimed to have a lease, defendant necessarily sur-
rendered or waived the right to have the question of whether 
it had or had not a subsisting lease on the premises reviewed 
by this court. By serving the notice and yielding possession of 
i Reported in full in the Pacific Reporter; reported as a memo-
randum decision without opinion in 59 Kan. 776. , 
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the premises to the owners it in effect intimated that it 
did not desire the premises longer, and hence conceded 3 
the plaintiffs' claim that they were entitled to the posses-
sion thereof. Defendant therefore abandoned the question of 
whether it had a lease or not, and that question is out of the 
case. Now the question whether the defendant should pay $500 
as monthly rent or only $350, the amount specified in the al-
leged lease, again depended upon whether the defendant could 
establish that it had a lease. Having surrendered the prem-
ises, and thereby abandoned the contention that it had a lease, 
it must also be deemed to have abandoned the right to have the 
question whether it should pay rent according to the terms of 
the alleged lease or in accordance with the judgment reviewed 
here. That the adandoning of the question of whether it had 
a lease carries with it the question of the payment of rent 
seems quite clear. Assuming that this court should find that 
the district court erred in holding that defendant did not have 
a lease and should find that it had one which would expire 
in May, 1923, as contended by the defendant, it would then 
follow that the defendant was liable to pay rent for the prem-
ises until that time, although it had already surrendered 
them. That it was so liable, or might be held liable, is pre-
cisely what the defendant escapes by acquiescing in the find-
ing of the court that it had no lease upon the premises. If, 
therefore, it escapes liability and concedes that it has no lease, 
it likewise must concede that it cannot have the question of 
whether it should pay rent according to the lease or in ac-
cordance with the court's finding reviewed here. We could 
not review the question of rent without necessarily consider-
ing the question of whether the defendant had a lease or not. 
The question of whether it had a lease being abandoned, the 
question of rent goes with it. 
To avoid any misunderstanding respecting the scope of this 
opinion, we feel constrained to say that we do not hold that 
in paying a judgment the defendant is necessarily prevented 
from prosecuting an appeal, or that he waives or abandons the 
one already taken, but what we do hold is, where, as here, the 
acquiescence in the judgment and the surrendering of pos-
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session of the premises necessarily amounts to a waiver of all 
the litigated questions, this court is precluded from reviewing 
the judgment. 
It follows, therefore, that the second motion to dismiss the 
appeal should be, and it accordingly is, sustained; and the 
appeal is dismissed, at appellant's cost. 
CORFMAN, C. J., and WEBER, GIDEON and THUR-
MAN, JJ. , concur. 
BIG COTTONWOOD TANNER DITCH CO. et ai. v. 
SHURTLIFF et ux. 
No 3374. Decided Nov. 28, 1919. On Modification of Opinion, 
April 21, 1920. (189 Pac. 587.) 
1. WATERS AND WATER COIRSES—USERS HEID ENTITLED TO Frow 
FOR CULINARY PURPOSES IX AUDITION TO THAT ALLOWED TOR IRRI-
OATION. In an action by an irrigation company against users 
of water from its dltchrtfcld, that users were entitled to the 
continuous flow they had used for years for culinary and do-
mestic purposes in addition to the quantity awarded for irri-
gation.* 
2. WATERS AND WATER COURSES—DITCH COMPACT ENTITLED TO 
WASTE WATER SAVED BT IMPROVING CONDUIT. 20,000 gallons of 
water delivered daily at defendant's home for culinary purposes 
held proper, although in excess of amount generally used by 
others under similar circumstances, and where, because of 
waste of ditch, 323,000 gallons must be released to supply such 
amount, It was proper to allow plaintiff irrigation company fbe 
privilege to construct an economical conduit and use the water 
saved. * 
3. WATERS AND WATEB COURSES—COURTS MAY PERMIT USER TO 
CHANGE PRIOR USER'S METHOD OP DIVERSION TO SWE WASTE. 
While an original appropriator of water acquires a right In bis 
i Big Cottonwood Tanner Ditch Co. v. Shurtliff, 49 Utah 574, 164 
Pac. 856. 
* Big Cottonwood Tanner Ditch Co. v. Shurtliff, 49 Utah 574, 164 
Pac. 856. 
APPENDIX VIII. 
76-5-304 CRIMINAL CODE 
Detaining child beyond visitation period. 
Parent 's detention of child beyond visitation 
period did not constitute crime of custodial in-
terference when the child was detained for a 
brief period for the purpose of seeking legal 
intervention to modify custody award and 
there was a good faith belief by parent that he 
had good cause, which he substantiated by fil-
ing a petition for custody modification and re-
ceiving a temporary restraining order to pre-
vent the child's removal from the state until 
the custodial issue could be determined 
Nielsen v Nielsen, 620 P 2d 511 (Utah 1980) 
Violation of custody order an element. 
Subsection (1Mb) criminalizes the conduct of 
those who, when exercising visitation or cus-
tody under the authority of a custody order, act 
to deprive another person of her or his custo-
dial or visitation rights in derogation of that 
existing order Even one who is subject to a 
custody or visitation decree does not violate 
this section unless he or she acts in derogation 
of his or her right under the order State v 
Smith, 764 P 2d 997 (Utah Ct App 1988) 
COLLATERAL REFERENCES 
Am. J u r 2d. — 1 Am J u r 2d Abduction 
and Kidnaping *} 19 
C.J .S . — 51 C J S Kidnapping * 4 
A.L.R. — Liability of legal or natural par-
ent, or one who aids and abets, for damages 
resulting from abduction of own child, 49 
A L R 4th 7 
Key N u m b e r s . — Kidnapping «=> 3 
76-5-301 Unlawful detention. 
(1) A person commits unlawful detention if he knowingly restrains another 
unlawfully so as to interfere substantially with his liberty. 
(2) Unlawful detention is a class B misdemeanor. 
History: C. 1953, 76-5-304, enac t ed by L. 
1973, ch . 196, *} 76-5-304. 
NOTES TO DECISIONS 
ANALYSIS 
Elements 
Kidnaping a minor 
Liability of peace officer 
Elements. 
For cases discussing definition and elements 
of former offense of false imprisonment, see 
Smith v Clark, 37 Utah 116, 106 P 653, 26 
L R A ( n s ) 9 5 3 , 1912B Ann Cas 1366(1910), 
Mildon v Bybee, 13 Utah 2d 400, 375 P 2d 458 
(1962) 
Kidnaping a minor. 
Unlawful detention is not a lesser included 
offense of kidnaping a minor, § 76-5-301 State 
v Cross, 649 P 2d 72 (Utah 1982) 
Liability of peace officer. 
A peace officer would not necessarily be held 
liable for mistaking identity of person named 
in warrant of arrest if he had exercised reason-
able diligence and care in ascertaining identity 
before he served warrant Mildon v Bybee, 13 
Utah 2d 400, 375 P2d 458 (1962) 
COLLATERAL REFERENCES 
Am. Jur. 2d. — 32 Am J u r 2d False Im-
prisonment § 151 
C.J .S . — 3 5 C J S False Imprisonment § 71 
A.L.R. — Excessiveness or inadequacy of 
compensatory damages for false imprisonment 
or arrest, 48 A L R 4th 165 
Penalties for common-law criminal offense of 
false imprisonment, 67 A L R 4th 1103 
Key Numbers. — False Imprisonment «=» 
43 
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(c) If the governing body of a municipality establishes a municipal 
department of the circuit court, a municipal justice court judge may not 
be appointed or elected. The circuit judges are successors of the justice 
court judges acting in the municipality where municipal departments of 
the circuit court are established. 
(2) (a) Governing bodies of municipalities establishing municipal depart-
ments of the circuit court may vacate the establishment of the circuit 
court by ordinance and return to a municipal justice court. 
(b) If a governing body establishes a circuit court or returns to a justice 
court system, it shall cause the Office of the State Court Administrator to 
be notified in writing within 30 days after the fact. 
History: C. 1953, 78-4-6, enacted by L. municipalities which have created city courts. 
1977, ch. 77, ft 1; 1987, ch. 228, 3 3; 1988, ch. The circuit court and the judges of them suc-
248, 5 30; 1990, ch. 59, S 31. ceed the city courts and have all the powers 
Repealed effective January 1, 1992. — and duties of the city judge'*; redesignated the 
Laws 1991, ch. 268, § 49 repeals § 78-4-6, as following subsections accordingly; and made 
last amended by Laws 1990, ch. 59, § 31, relat- minor stylistic changes, 
ing to report to court administrator regarding The 1990 amendment, effective April 23, 
municipal department of circuit court, effective 1990, substituted "justice court judge" for "jus-
January 1, 1992. tice of the peace" in the first sentence and "jus-
Amendment Notes. — The 1988 amend- tice court judges" for "justices of the peace" in 
ment, effective April 25, 1988, deleted former the second sentence in Subsection (l)(c) and 
Subsection (l)(a) which read "A municipal de- substituted "justice court" for "justice of the 
partment of the circuit court is created for all peace" twice in Subsection (2). 
78-4-7. Civil jurisdiction — Exceptions [Effective until 
January 1, 1992]. 
The circuit court has civil jurisdiction, both law and equity, in all matters if 
the sum claimed is less than $10,000, exclusive of court costs, except: 
(1) in actions to determine the title to real property, but not excluding 
actions to foreclose mechanics* liens; 
(2) in actions of divorce, child custody, and paternity; 
(3) in actions under the Utah Uniform Probate Code; 
(4) in actions to review the decisions of any state administrative 
agency, board, council, commission, or hearing officer; 
(5) in actions seeking remedies in the form of extraordinary writs; and 
(6) in all other actions where, by statute, jurisdiction is exclusively 
vested in the district court or other trial or appellate court. 
Civil jurisdiction — Exceptions [Effective 
January 1, 1992]. 
The circuit court has civil jurisdiction, both law and equity, in all matters if 
the sum claimed is less than $20,000, exclusive of court costs, except: 
(1) in actions to determine the title to real property, but not excluding 
actions to foreclose mechanics* liens; 
(2) in actions of divorce, child custody, and paternity; 
(3) in actions under the Utah Uniform Probate Code; 
(4) in actions to review the decisions of any state administrative 
agency, board, council, commission, or hearing officer; 
(5) in actions seeking remedies in the form of extraordinary writs; and 
CIRCUIT COURTS 78-4-8 
(6) in all other actions where, by statute, jurisdiction is exclusively 
vested in the district court or other trial or appellate court. 
History: C. 1963, 78-4-7, enacted by L. 
1977, ch. 77, 3 1; 1983, ch. 76, 3 1; 1986, ch. 
121, 3 1; 1988, ch. 248, 3 31; 1991, ch. 268, 
3 31. 
Amended effective January 1, 1992. — 
Laws 1991, ch. 268, § 31 amends this section 
effective January 1,1992. See amendment note 
below. 
Amendment Notes. — The 1988 amend-
ment, effective April 25,1988, deleted the sub-
section designation (1) at the beginning of the 
section; substituted the subsection designa-
tions (1) to (6) for former subsection designa-
tions (l)(a) to (1X0; deleted former Subsection 
(2) which read T h e circuit court shall have 
concurrent jurisdiction with justices of the 
peace courts where the sum claimed is less 
than $750"; and made minor stylistic changes. 
The 1991 amendment, effective January 1, 
1992, substituted "$20,000" for "$10,000" in 
the introductory language. 
NOTES TO DECISIONS 
ANALYSIS 
Arbitration. 
Title to real estate. 
Arbitration. 
The Utah Arbitration Act creates a statutory 
remedy for judicial enforcement, modification, 
or vacation of an arbitration award, and specif-
ically provides that the remedy will be imple-
mented by proceedings in the district courts of 
this state. A circuit court cannot have subject 
matter jurisdiction under the Utah Arbitration 
Act, notwithstanding this section. Transworld 
Sys. v. Robison, 796 P.2d 407 (Utah Ct. App. 
1990). 
Title to real estate. 
An order of the circuit court purporting to 
adjudicate ownership rights to real property 
and the proceeds of its sale was null and void. 
A circuit court could not, through consent or 
waiver, expand its jurisdiction to adjudicate 
claims involving the title to real property. 
Thompson v. Jackson, 743 P.2d 1230 (Utah Ct. 
App. 1987). 
78-4-7.5. Trials de novo. 
The circuit court has appellate jurisdiction to hear trials de novo of the 
judgments of the justices* courts and trials de novo of the small claims depart-
ment of the circuit court. 
History? C 1953. 78-4-7.5, enacted by L. 
1986, ch. 47, 5 66; 1988, ch. 73, § 2; 1988, ch. 
248, 3 32. 
Amendment Notes. — The 1988 amend-
ment by Laws 1988, Chapter 73, effective April 
25,1988, rewrote the section which read "The 
circuit court has jurisdiction to hear trials de 
novo of the judgments of the justices' courts." 
The 1988 amendment by Laws 1988, Chap-
ter 248, effective April 25. 1988, inserted "ap-
pellate" before "jurisdiction." 
This section is set out as reconciled by the 
Office of Legislative Research and General 
Counsel. 
78-4-8. Venue and change of judge provisions — Excep-
tions [Repealed effective January 1, 1992]. 
Provisions of law regarding venue and change of judge apply to the circuit 
courts the same as district courts, except cases arising under or by reason of 
the violation of municipal ordinances may, upon stipulation of the parties or 
upon order of the court for good cause shown, be tried and decided in a munici-
pality or county within the circuit other than the municipality or county in 
which the violation occurred. 
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Court. 
History: C. 1953, 78-2a-2, enacted «by L. fice of a judge of the Court of Appeals is 6 years 
1986, ch. 47, § 45; 1988, ch. 248, § 7. and until a successor is appointed and ap-
Amendment Notes. — The 1988 amend- proved under Section 20-1-7.1/' into the 
ment, effective April 25, 1988, in Subsection present third and fourth sentences and made 
(1), divided and rewrote the former third sen- minor stylistic changes, 
tence, which read "Thereafter, the term of of-
78-2a-3. Court of Appeals jurisdiction [Effective until Jan-
uary 1, 1992]. 
(1) The Court of Appeals has jurisdiction to issue all extraordinary writs 
and to issue all writs and process necessary: 
(a) to carry into effect its judgments, orders, and decrees; or 
(b) in aid of its jurisdiction. 
(2) The Court of Appeals has appellate jurisdiction, including jurisdiction of 
interlocutory appeals, over: 
(a) the final orders and decrees resulting from formal adjudicative pro-
ceedings of state agencies or appeals from the district court review of 
informal adjudicative proceedings of the agencies, except the Public Ser-
vice Commission, State Tax Commission, Board of State Lands, Board of 
Oil, Gas, and Mining, and the state engineer; 
(b) appeals from the district court review of: 
(i) adjudicative proceedings of agencies of political subdivisions of 
the state or other local agencies; and 
(ii) a challenge to agency action under Section 63-46a-12.1; 
(c) appeals from the juvenile courts; 
(d) appeals from the circuit courts, except those from the small claims 
department of a circuit court; 
(e) interlocutory appeals from any court of record in criminal cases, 
except those involving a charge of a first degree or capital felony; 
(f) appeals from district court in criminal cases, except those involving 
a conviction of a first degree or capital felony; 
(g) appeals from orders on petitions for extraordinary writs sought by 
persons who are incarcerated or serving any other criminal sentence, 
except petitions constituting a challenge to a conviction of or the sentence 
for a first degree or capital felony; 
(h) appeals from district court involving domestic relations cases, in-
cluding, but not limited to, divorce, annulment, property division, child 
custody, support, visitation, adoption, and paternity; 
(i) appeals from the Utah Military Court; and 
0") cases transferred to the Court of Appeals from the Supreme Court. 
(3) The Court of Appeals upon its own motion only and by the vote of four 
judges of the court may certify to the Supreme Court for original appellate 
11 
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78-36-1. "Forcible entry" defined. 
Every person is guilty of a forcible entry, who either: 
(1) by breaking open doors, windows or other parts of a house, or by 
fraud, intimidation or stealth, or by any kind of violence or circumstances 
of terror, enters upon or into any real property; or, 
(2) after entering peaceably upon real property, turns out by force, 
threats or menacing conduct the party in actual possession. 
History: L. 1951, ch. 58, § 1; C. 1943, Cross-References . — Burglary and crimi-
Supp., 104-36-1. nal trespass, §§ 76-6-201 to 76-6-206. 
NOTES TO DECISIONS 
ANALYSIS 
Damages. 
—Mental anguish. 
—Nominal. 
Forcible detainer distinguished. 
Landlord and tenant. 
—Contract rights. 
—Motel operator and occupant. 
Unlawful eviction. 
Policy of section. 
—Abolishment of common-law. 
Purpose of provisions. 
—Preventing disturbances of peace. 
—Summary remedy. 
Rent. 
Separate tort action. 
What constitutes forcible entry. 
—Removal of doors. 
Damages. 
—Mental angu i sh . 
Tenant who is wrongfully evicted can collect 
damages for mental anguish and humiliation. 
Mental pain and suffering in connection with a 
wrong which apart from such pain and suffer-
ing constitutes a cause of action is a proper 
element of damages where it is a natural and 
proximate consequence of the wrong. Lambert 
v. Sine, 123 Utah 145, 256 P.2d 241 (1953). 
—Nominal. 
The statute places a duty upon any person, 
whether entitled to possession or not, not to 
use force or stealth or fraud in gaining posses-
sion of realty. Correspondingly, it creates a 
right in the person in actual peaceable posses-
sion not to have his possession disturbed other 
than by legal process. Therefore, regardless of 
his lack of entitlement to the property, the ten-
ant has a cause of action for the invasion of 
that right. Where no actual damages are 
proved he should be awarded nominal damages 
to preserve the right. King v. Firm, 3 Utah 2d 
419, 285 P.2d 1114 (1955). 
Forc ib le d e t a i n e r d i s t inguished . 
Forcible entry and forcible detainer, while 
often spoken of together, are in fact separate 
and distinct wrongs. Buchanan v. Crites, 106 
Utah 428, 150 P.2d 100, 154 A.L.R. 167 (1944). 
L a n d l o r d a n d t enan t . 
—Con t r ac t r ights . 
Anyone committing acts specifically prohib-
ited under this section would be guilty of forc-
ible entry including a party who may by con-
tract be authorized to enter or an owner who as 
a matter of law may have a right to possession; 
contract purporting to establish right of re-
entry for default of rent payments did not give 
landlord right to remove employee of tenants 
from office and change locks on all doors. Free-
way Park Bldg., Inc. v. Western States Whsle. 
Supply, 22 Utah 2d 266, 451 P.2d 778 (1969). 
—Motel o p e r a t o r a n d o c c u p a n t . 
Unlawful evict ion. 
Where evidence disclosed tha t relationship 
between operators of a motel and the occupants 
of an apartment therein was one of landlord 
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and tenant, and not one of innkeeper and 
guest, the occupants could only be dispossessed 
of the apartment by resort to the statutory 
remedy of unlawful detainer. When the owner 
of the motel locked out the occupants for 
unpaid rent, there was an unlawful eviction. 
Lambert v. Sine, 123 Utah 145, 256 P.2d 241 
(1953). 
Policy of section. 
—Abolishment of common-law. 
The forcible entry statute expressed a policy 
that no person should enter by force, stealth, 
fraud or intimidation, premises of which an-
other had peaceable possession. This had the 
effect of taking away the common-law right of 
a landlord to possess his own property by no 
more force than was necessary and left the one 
against whom force was used to pursue his 
common-law action. Buchanan v. Crites, 106 
Utah 428, 150 P.2d 100, 154 A.L.R. 167 (1944). 
Purpose of provisions. 
—Preventing disturbances of peace. 
The forcible entry and detainer statute was 
enacted for the primary purpose of preventing 
disturbances of the peace brought about 
through self-help in the matter of disposses-
sion. King v. Firm, 3 Utah 2d 419, 285 P.2d 
1114 (1955). 
—Summary remedy. 
Purpose of this statute is to provide a speedy 
remedy, summary in character, to obtain pos-
session of real property. Paxton v. Fisher, 86 
Utah 408, 45 P.2d 903 (1935). 
Rent 
This chapter provides a summary remedy for 
the recovery of real property in case of forcible 
entry or the forcible or unlawful detainer 
thereof. That is the purpose of the chapter, and 
not to deal with the subject of remedies for 
rent. The question of rent is drawn into the 
statute, not for the purpose of providing a rem-
edy for its recovery, but to complete a case of 
unlawful detainer, which is the gist of the ac-
tion. Voyles v. Straka, 77 Utah 171, 292 P. 913 
(1930). 
Separate tort action. 
A landlord who is entitled to possession 
must, on the refusal of the tenant to surrender 
the premises, resort to the remedy given by 
law to secure it. A violation of that duty set by 
the statute gives rise to an action for damages, 
not in an action under the forcible entry and 
detainer statute but as a separate tort. King v. 
Firm, 3 Utah 2d 419, 285 P.2d 1114 (1955). 
What constitutes forcible entry. 
—Removal of doors. 
Where defendant landlord entered upon the 
premises in plaintiffs absence by unlocking 
the doors and removing the doors from their 
hinges and carrying them away, the weather 
being at the time freezing, these facts were 
held to sufficiently show a forcible entry. Bu-
chanan v. Crites, 106 Utah 428, 150 P.2d 100, 
154 A.L.R. 167 (1944). 
COLLATERAL REFERENCES 
Utah Law Review. — Landlord-Tenant 
Law: A Perspective on Reform in Utah, 1981 
Utah L. Rev. 727, 738. 
Am. Jur. 2d. — 35 Am. Jur. 2d Forcible 
Entry and Detainer § 1. 
C.J.S. — 36A C.J.S. Forcible Entry and De-
tainer §§ 1, 2. 
Key Numbers. — Forcible Entry and De-
tainer «= 4. 
78-36-2, "Forcible detainer" defined. 
Every person is guilty of a forcible detainer who either: 
(1) by force, or by menaces and threats of violence, unlawfully holds 
and keeps the possession of any real property, whether the same was 
acquired peaceably or otherwise; or, 
(2) in the nighttime, or during the absence of the occupants of any real 
property, unlawfully enters thereon, and, after demand made for the sur-
render thereof, refuses for the period of three days to surrender the same 
to such former occupant. The occupant of real property within the mean-
ing of this subdivision is one who within five days preceding such unlaw-
ful entry was in the peaceable and undisturbed possession of such lands. 
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History: L. 1951, ch. 58, § 1; C. 1943, 
Supp., 104-36-2. 
ANALYSIS 
Consent to entry. 
—Evidence. 
—Failure of action. 
Issues. 
—Immediate right of possession. 
Liability. 
—Lessor. 
—Purchaser. 
Occupancy "within five days." 
—Allegation. 
"Unlawfully enters." 
Consent to entry. 
—Evidence. 
To show intention of parties and acquies-
cence by plaintiff in defendant's possession, es-
crow agreement and quitclaim deed executed 
by plaintiff were held to be properly admitted 
in evidence. Seeley v. Houston, 105 Utah 202, 
141 P.2d 880 (1943). 
—Failure of action. 
As one of the elements of this action is the 
unlawful entry, the action must fail if it is 
found that defendant entered with consent of 
plaintiff. Seeley v. Houston, 105 Utah 202, 141 
P.2d 880 (1943). 
Issues. 
—Immediate right of possession. 
In action of forcible entry and detainer, the 
only question involved is the immediate right 
to possession. Seeley v. Houston, 105 Utah 202, 
141 P.2d 880 (1943). 
Liability. 
—Lessor. 
Where, without serving the three days' no-
tice required by § 78-36-3(3), a lessor entered 
the premises of his tenant, whose rent was two 
months in arrears, changed the locks on the 
doors and refused to allow the tenant to enter 
to remove equipment and perishable goods, les-
sor was guilty of forcible detainer and conver-
sion of the personal property on the premises. 
Peterson v. Piatt, 16 Utah 2d 330, 400 P.2d 507 
(1965). 
Cross-References. — Burglary and crimi-
nal trespass, §§ 76-6-201 to 76-6-206. 
—Purchaser. 
Where purchaser of state land took posses-
sion of land while lessee from state was away 
and refused to quit premises upon demand, he 
was liable for forcible entry and detainer, since 
such purchaser should have made proper de-
mand, and if it was refused, should have set-
tled question of possession by law. Paxton v. 
Fisher, 86 Utah 408, 45 P.2d 903 (1935); Bu-
chanan v. Crites, 106 Utah 428, 150 P.2d 100, 
154 A.L.R. 167 (1944). 
Fact that one of defendants in forcible de-
tainer action by lessee of state land had signed 
purchase contract covering such land would 
not, in itself, make him personally liable. Pax-
ton v. Fisher, 86 Utah 408, 45 P.2d 903 (1935); 
Buchanan v. Crites, 106 Utah 428, 150 P.2d 
100, 154 A.L.R. 167 (1944). 
Occupancy "within five days." 
—Allegation. 
Allegation of "more" than five days includes 
period of "within" five days. Woodbury v. 
Bunker, 98 Utah 216, 98 P.2d 948 (1940); 
American Mut. Bldg. & Loan Co. v. Jones, 102 
Utah 318, 117 P.2d 293 (1941), rehearing de-
nied, 102 Utah 328, 133 P.2d 332 (1943). 
"Unlawfully enters." 
'Unlawfully enters" in Subsection (2) means 
unlawfully as relating to an occupant who was 
there within five days. Woodbury v. Bunker, 
98 Utah 216, 98 P.2d 948 (1940); Buchanan v. 
Crites, 106 Utah 428, 150 P.2d 100, 154 A.L.R. 
167 (1944). 
NOTES TO DECISIONS 
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CHAPTER 35 
EXTRAORDINARY WRITS 
Section 
78-35-5. Penalties for wrongful acts of de-
fendant. 
78-35-5. Penalties for wrongful acts of defendant 
If the defendant attempts to evade the service of the writ of habeas corpus, 
or if the defendant or any officer willfully fails to comply with the legal duties 
imposed upon him, or if he disobeys the order of discharge, he is guilty of a 
class B misdemeanor, and shall also forfeit to the person aggrieved not more 
than $5,000. Any person knowingly aiding in or abetting invalidation of this 
section is subject to the same punishment and forfeiture. 
History: L. 1951, ch. 58, § 1; C. 1943, Amendment Notes. — The 1991 amend-
Supp., 104-35-5; L. 1986, ch. 178, § 66; 1991, ment, effective April 29, 1991, substituted 
ch. 241, § 107. "class B" for "class A" in the first sentence. 
CHAPTER 36 
FORCIBLE ENTRY AND DETAINER 
Section 
78-36-3. Unlawful detainer by tenant for 
term less than life. 
78-36-3- Unlawful detainer by tenant for term less than 
life-
CD A tenant of real property, for a term less than life, is guilty of an unlaw-
ful detainer: 
(a) when he continues in possession, in person or by subtenant, of the 
property or any part of it, after the expiration of the specified term or 
period for which it is let to him, which specified term or period, whether 
established by express or implied contract, or whether written or parol, 
shall be terminated without notice at the expiration of the specified term 
or period; 
(b) when, having leased real property for an indefinite time with 
monthly or other periodic rent reserved: 
(i) he continues in possession of it in person or by subtenant after 
the end of any month or period, in cases where the owner, his desig-
nated agent, or any successor in estate of the owner, 15 days or more 
prior to the end of that month or period, has served notice requiring 
him to quit the premises at the expiration of that month or period; or 
(ii) in cases of tenancies at will, where he remains in possession of 
the premises after the expiration of a notice of not less than five days; 
(c) when he continues in possession, in person or by subtenant, after 
default in the payment of any rent and after a notice in writing requiring 
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in the alternative the payment of the rent or the surrender of the de-
tained premises, has remained uncomplied with for a period of three days 
after service, which notice may be served at any time after the rent 
becomes due; 
(d) when he assigns or sublets the leased premises contrary to the 
covenants of the lease, or commits or permits waste on the premises, or 
when he sets up or carries on any unlawful business on or in the premises, 
or when he suffers, permits, or maintains on or about the premises any 
nuisance, and remains in possession after service upon him of a three 
days' notice to quit; or 
(e) when he continues in possession, in person or by subtenant, after a 
neglect or failure to perform any condition or covenant of the lease or 
agreement under which the property is held, other than those previously 
mentioned, and after notice in writing requiring in the alternative the 
performance of the conditions or covenant or the surrender of the prop-
erty, served upon him and upon any subtenant in actual occupation of the 
premises remains uncomplied with for three days after service. Within 
three days after the service of the notice, the tenant, any subtenant in 
actual occupation of the premises, any mortgagee of the term, or other 
person interested in its continuance may perform the condition or cove-
nant and thereby save the lease from forfeiture, except that if the cove-
nants and conditions of the lease violated by the lessee cannot afterwards 
be performed, then no notice need be given. 
(2) Unlawful detainer by an owner resident of a mobile home is determined 
under Chapter 16, Title 57, Mobile Home Park Residency Act. 
History: L. 1951, ch. 58, § 1; C. 1943, and (2) as Subsections (l)(a) and (l)(b), desig-
Supp,, 104-36-3; L. 1981, ch. 160, § 1; 1986, nated former Subsections (2)(a) and (2)(b) as 
ch. 137, § 1; 1989, ch. 101, § 1. Subsection (l)(b)(i) and Subsection (l)(b)(ii), 
Amendment Notes. — The 1989 amend designated former Subsections (3) to (5) as Sub-
ment, effective Apnl 24, 1989, inserted the sections (l)(c) to (l)(e), added Subsection (2), 
subsection designation (1) at the beginning of
 a n d m a d e m m o r s tyhstic changes 
the section, designated former Subsections (1) 
78-36-10- Judgment for restitution, damages, and rent — 
Immediate enforcement — Treble damages. 
NOTES TO DECISIONS 
Damages. ume See Monroe, Inc v Sidwell, 770 ?M 
—Treble damages. 1022 (Utah Ct App 1989) 
In accord with first paragraph in bound vol-
COLLATERAL REFERENCES 
A.L.R. — Air-conditioning appliance, equip-
ment, or apparatus as fixture, 69 A L R 4th 
359. 
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COLLATERAL REFERENCES 
Am. Jur. 2d. — 35 Am. Jur. 2d Forcible Key Numbers. — Forcible Entry and De-
Entry and Detainer § 1. tainer *=» 5, 
C.J.S. — 36A C.J.S. Forcible Entry and De-
tainer §§ 1, 2. 
78-36-3. Unlawful detainer by tenant for term less than 
life- (/ 
A tenant of real property, for a term less than life, is guilty of an unlawful 
detainer: 
(1) when he continues in possession, in person or by subtenant, of the 
property or any part of it, after the expiration of the specified term or 
period for which it is let to him which specified term or period, whether 
established by express or implied contract, or whether written or parol, 
shall be terminated without notice at the expiration of the specified term 
or period; 
(2) when, having leased real property for an indefinite time with 
monthly or other periodic rent reserved: 
(a) he continues in possession of it in person or by subtenant after 
the end of any month or period, in cases where the owner, his desig-
nated agent, or any successor in estate of the owner, 15 days or more 
prior to the end of that month or period, has served notice requiring 
him to quit the premises at the expiration of that month or period; or 
(b) in cases of tenancies at will, where he remains in possession of 
the premises after the expiration of a notice of not less than five days; 
(3) when he continues in possession, in person or by subtenant, after 
default in the payment of any rent and after a notice in writing requiring 
in the alternative the payment of the rent or the surrender of the de-
tained premises, has remained uncomplied with for a period of three days 
after service which notice may be served at any time after the rent be-
comes due; 
(4) when he assigns or sublets the leased premises contrary to the 
covenants of the lease, or commits or permits waste on the premises, or 
when he sets up or carries on any unlawful business on or in the premises, 
or when he suffers, permits, or maintains on or about the premises any 
nuisance, and remains in possession after service upon him of a three 
days' notice to quit; or 
(5) when he continues in possession, in person or by subtenant, after a 
neglect or failure to perform any condition or covenant of the lease or 
agreement under which the property is held, other than those previously 
mentioned, and after notice in writing requiring in the alternative the 
performance of the conditions or covenant or the surrender of the prop-
erty, served upon him and upon any subtenant in actual occupation of the 
premises remains uncomplied with for three days after service. Within 
three days after the service of the notice the tenant, or any subtenant in 
actual occupation of the premises, or any mortgagee of the term, or other 
person interested in its continuance, may perform the condition or cove-
nant and thereby save the lease from forfeiture except that if the cove-
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nants and conditions of the lease violated by the lessee cannot afterwards 
be performed, then no notice need be given. 
History: L. 1951, ch. 58, § 1; C. 1943, 
Supp., 104-36-3; L. 1981, ch. 160, § 1; 1986, 
ch. 137, § 1. 
Amendment Notes. — The 1986 amend-
ment substituted "three days" for "five days" in 
the first sentence of Subsection (5) and made 
stylistic changes throughout the section 
Cross-References. — Nuisances, Title 47 
Right to recover treble damages from ten-
ants committing waste, § 78-38-2 
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—Waiver 
Strict statutory compliance 
—Not required 
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Cause of action. 
—Default in rent. 
No cause of action for unlawful detainer 
based on default in payment of rent survived 
where tenant tendered rent due within three 
days after service of unlawful detainer action, 
regardless of defects in such notice Dang v 
Cox Corp, 655 P 2d 658 (Utah 1982) 
—Prerequisites. 
Notice to quit is necessary to give rise to 
cause of action Carstensen v Hansen, 107 
Utah 234, 152 P 2d 954 (1944) 
—Presumptions. 
Action of unlawful detainer presupposes ab-
sence of fraud and force, as well as existence of 
relation of landlord and tenant Holladay Coal 
Co v Kirker, 20 Utah 192, 57 P 882 (1899) 
—When determined. 
Whether a cause of action exists under this 
section is to be determined at the time the ac-
tion is commenced Van Zyverden v Farrar, 15 
Utah 2d 367, 393 P 2d 468 (1964) 
—When exists. 
Upon expiration of tenant's lease, the tenant 
is subject to ouster by an unlawful detainer 
action (not forcible detainer) under and pursu-
ant to this section Woodbury v Bunker, 98 
Utah 216, 98 P 2d 948 (1940), American Mut 
Bldg & Loan Co v Jones, 102 Utah 318, 117 
P 2d 293 (1941), rehearing denied, 102 Utah 
328, 133 P2d 332 (1943) 
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Unless tenant has retained the right to 
refuse inspection by prospective purchasers of 
premises, unreasonable refusal to permit entry 
of premises for tha t purpose constitutes unlaw-
ful detainer. Glenn v. Keyes, 107 Utah 415, 
154 P.2d 642 (1944). 
Federal r egu la t ions . 
—Modification of s t a t e remedies . 
OPA rental and housing regulations, under 
Federal Price Control Act, were binding upon 
Utah courts and modified any state remedy to 
extent that such remedy was in conflict with 
that act. Callister v. Spencer, 113 Utah 497, 
196 P.2d 714 (1948). 
Notice to quit. 
—Administrative claim. 
Notice to quit or pay rent served on govern-
ment as required by this section was not an 
administrative claim sufficient to satisfy 28 
U.S.C. § 2675(a), and federal court therefore 
had no jurisdiction over forcible entry and de-
tainer action brought under Federal Tort 
Claims Act. Three-M Enters., Inc. v. United 
States, 548 F.2d 293 (10th Cir. 1977). 
—Liability of t e n a n t 
Action by lessor, after end of fixed term of 
lease, to terminate lease and require lessee to 
vacate premises did not terminate provision 
obliging tenant to pay attorney fees, where 
parties entered stipulation, while matter was 
pending, tha t lessee considered lease in effect 
and held under it after end of fixed term. Milli-
ner v. Farmer, 24 Utah 2d 326, 471 P.2d 151 
(1970). 
—Prerequis i tes . 
Notice in accordance with Subsection (5) 
should precede notice to quit, and must be un-
complied with for five days after the service 
before a notice to quit is in order. Fireman's 
Ins. Co. v. Brown, 529 P.2d 419 (Utah 1974). 
—Sufficiency. 
A notice to quit is sufficient under subsection 
'2) in the case of a tenancy a t will, as provided 
in contract of sale in case of default, where it 
merely declares a forfeiture, and is not insuffi-
cient under subsection (5) because not giving 
purchasers alternative of performing condi-
tions of the agreement. Forrester v. Cook, 77 
Utah 137, 292 P. 206 (1930); American Hold-
ing Co. v. Hanson, 23 Utah 2d 432, 464 P.2d 
592 (1970). 
Notice by landlord stating that tenants had 
failed to make payments of rent due under 
lease, had failed to pay utility bills, and fur-
ther providing that tenants were to quit prem-
ises and deliver up possession to landlord 
within fifteen days did not comply with statu-
tory requirements under this section; in ab-
sence of compliance, landlord was not entitled 
to maintain action for restitution of premises. 
American Holding Co. v. Hanson, 23 Utah 2d 
432, 464 P.2d 592 (1970). 
Notice of forfeiture, while sufficient to termi-
nate a lease for breach of covenant, is not suffi-
cient to put lessee in unlawful detainer; the 
notice to quit must be in the alternative, i.e., 
either perform or quit, before lessee becomes 
subject to the provisions of this chapter. 
Pingree v. Continental Group of Utah, Inc., 
558 P.2d 1317 (Utah 1976). 
Lessee was not in unlawful detainer and les-
sor was not entitled to maintain an action un-
der this section where lessor's notice to vacate 
premises was defective in that it did not state 
that lessee had the alternative of paying the 
delinquent rent or surrendering the premises. 
Sovereen v. Meadows, 595 P.2d 852 (Utah 
1979). 
The critical distinction between a notice of 
unlawful detainer and a notice of forfeiture is 
that the notice of forfeiture simply declares a 
termination of the lease without giving the les-
see the alternative of making up the defi-
ciency. Dang v. Cox Corp., 655 P.2d 658 (Utah 
1982). 
A notice to a month-to-month tenant to quit 
the premises need not contain the alternative 
of paying rent. Ute-Cal Land Dev. v. Inter-
mountain Stock Exch., 628 P.2d 1278 (Utah 
1981). 
Notice to quit which notified tenant that he 
was violating substantial obligations of ten-
ancy by conducting certain businesses on 
premises, and which plainly informed tenant 
that he must desist from such objectionable 
practices by certain date and that, if on or be-
fore that date he failed to desist therefrom and 
had not surrendered premises, action would be 
commenced for restitution of premises, was not 
defective because notice was not expressed in 
the alternative as required by subsection (5) of 
former § 104-60-3, i.e., tha t violation must 
cease or tenancy be vacated, since such was 
plain intent of notice without use of word "or." 
Callister v. Spencer, 113 Utah 497, 196 P.2d 
714 (1948). 
—Tenancy a t will. 
It is only after buyer is in the status of a 
tenant a t will tha t he is amenable to the notice 
provided by this section, which requires him to 
vacate within five days or be guilty of an un-
lawful detainer. Van Zyverden v. Farrar, 15 
Utah 2d 367, 393 P.2d 468 (1964). 
At common law a tenant a t will was not enti-
tled to notice to quit possession. Buchanan v. 
Crites, 106 Utah 428,150 P.2d 100, 154 A.L.R. 
167 (1944). 
Where lease was terminated by failure of 
tenant to pay rent and taxes, the tenant be-
came a tenant at will and landlord properly 
proceeded to regain possession by the proce-
537 
78-36-3 JUDICIAL CODE 
dure set forth in subsection (2) by giving notice 
to vacate. Shoemaker v. Pioneer Invs., 14 Utah 
2d 250, 381 P.2d 735 (1963). 
Notice to purchaser who had become tenant 
at will for failure to make payment was suffi-
cient under subsection (5) even though several 
months had elapsed between first and final no-
tice. Beneficial Life Ins. Co. v. Dennett, 24 
Utah 2d 310, 470 P.2d 406 (1970). 
Persons liable. 
No one but tenant of real property for term 
less than life can be guilty of unlawful de-
tainer. Hoiladay Coal Co. v. Kirker, 20 Utah 
192, 57 P. 882 (1899). 
Pleadings. 
—Tenancy at will. 
Since on month-to-month tenancy owner 
could recover property on fifteen-day notice, al-
legation in complaint that such tenant had vio-
lated substantial obligations of rental agree-
ment was not necessary in unlawful detainer 
action. Callister v. Spencer, 113 Utah 497, 196 
P.2d 714 (1948). 
Right of re-entry. 
—Contractual provisions. 
Under contract for sale and exchange of real 
estate, providing that seller at his option could 
re-enter premises and be released from his ob-
ligations upon default of buyer, seller was 
bound to give buyer notice of his intention to 
take advantage of forfeiture provision of con-
tract, since such provision was not self-execut-
ing. Leone v. Zuniga, 84 Utah 417, 34 P.2d 699, 
94 A.L.R. 1232 (1934). 
Strict performance. 
—Waiver. 
Acceptance by vendor of purchaser's past-
due payments under uniform real estate con-
tract, and other conduct leading latter to be-
lieve that strict performance would not be re-
quired by vendor, imposes duty on vendor to 
give purchaser reasonable notice before vendor 
may insist on strict performance by purchaser. 
Pacific Dev. Co. v. Stewart, 113 Utah 403, 195 
P.2d 748 (1948). 
Strict statutory compl iance . 
—Not required. 
There is no reason for the strict rule that 
landlord must demand the precise or exact 
amount of rent due or lose his right to recover 
Am. Jur. 2d. — 49 Am. Jur . 2d Landlord 
and Tenant § 1115 et seq.; 50 Am. Ju r . 2d 
Landlord and Tenant § 1205 et seq. 
possession of the premises. A tenant is guilty of 
unlawful detainer when he continues in pos-
session after default in payment of any r e n t 
and after notice in writing requiring in the al-
ternative the payment of the rent or the sur-
render of the premises, etc. Commercial Block 
Realty Co. v. Merchants* Protective Ass'n 71 
Utah 505, 267 P. 1009 (1928). 
—Required. 
This section, which provides a severe rem-
edy, must be strictly complied with before the 
cause of action thereon may be maintained. 
Van Zyverden v. Farrar, 15 Utah 2d 367 393 
P.2d 468 (1964). 
Termination of lease. 
A lease may be terminated pursuant to an 
unlawful detainer action. Hackford v. Snow 
657 P.2d 1271 (Utah 1982). 
Treb le d a m a g e s . 
—Cont rac t of sale . 
In a suit for amounts due under a contract of 
sale of real estate, where the vendors gave no-
tice of forfeiture of the contract only and did 
not give the purchaser an alternative to pay up 
or quit, as is required under this section, the 
vendors were not entitled to treble damages for 
unlawful detainer. Erisman v. Overman, 11 
Utah 2d 258, 358 P.2d 85 (1961). 
—In te rvenor . 
A person not actually occupying the prem-
ises who intervenes in an action to obtain pos-
session and for damages for unlawful detainer, 
and who asserts ownership and the right to 
possession by the occupier as his tenant, may 
be guilty of unlawful detainer and liable for 
treble damages where the court finds this in-
tervener's claim invalid. Tanner v. Lawler, 6 
Utah 2d 84, 305 P.2d 882, modified on another 
point, 6 Utah 2d 268, 311 P.2d 791 (1957). 
—Lease. 
Under a lease contract for a period of years, 
in which the lessee defaulted, notice by the les-
sor for the lessees to quit the premises was not 
sufficient for treble damages. Under such a 
lease the statutes require an alternative notice 
that the tenant either perform or quit before he 
becomes an unlawful detainer and subject to 
treble damages. Jacobson v. Swan, 3 Utah 2d 
59, 278 P.2d 294 (1954), distinguished, Jensen 
v. Nielson, 26 Utah 2d 96,485 P.2d 673 (1971). 
C.J .S. — 52A C.J.S. Landlord and Tenant 
§ 758. 
A.L.R. — Right of landlord legally entitled 
COLLATERAL REFERENCES 
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to possession to dispossess tenant without legal Express or implied restriction on lessee's use 
process, 6 A.L.R.3d 177. of residential property for business purposes, 
Grazing or pasturage agreement as violation 46 A.L.R.4th 496. 
of covenant in lease or provision of statute Key Numbers. — Landlord and Tenant «=» 
against assigning or subletting without lessor's 290 
consent, 71 A.L.R.3d 780. 
78-36-4. Right of tenant of agricultural lands to hold over. 
In all cases of tenancy upon agricultural lands, where the tenant has held 
over and retained possession for more than 60 days after the expiration of his 
term without any demand of possession or notice to quit by the owner, his 
designated agent, or his successor in estate, he shall be deemed to be held by 
permission of the owner, his designated agent, or his successor in estate, and 
shall be entitled to hold under the terms of the lease for another full year, and 
shall not be guilty of an unlawful detainer during that year; and the holding 
over for the 60-day period shall be taken and construed as a consent on the 
part of the tenant to hold for another year. 
History: L. 1951, ch. 5S, § 1; C. 1943, 
Supp., 104-36-4; L. 1981, ch. 160, § 2. 
COLLATERAL REFERENCES 
Am. Jur. 2d. — 50 Am. Jur. 2d Landlord Key Numbers. — Landlord and Tenant <s=» 
and Tenant § 1193. 114(3). 
C.J.S. — 51C C.J.S. Landlord and Tenant 
§ 136(3). 
78-36-5. Remedies available to tenant against under-
tenant. 
A tenant may take proceedings similar to those prescribed in this chapter to 
obtain possession of the premises let to an undertenant in case of his unlawful 
detention of the premises underlet to him. 
History: L. 1951, ch. 58, § 1; C. 1943, 
Supp., 104-36-5. 
COLLATERAL REFERENCES 
Am. Jur . 2d. —49 Am. Jur. 2d Landlord and Key Numbers. — Landlord and Tenant <s= 
Tenant § 506. 80(3). 
C.J.S. — 51C C.J.S. Landlord and Tenant 
§ 48(1) et seq. 
78-36-6. Notice to quit — How served. 
The notices required by the preceding sections may be served: 
(1) by delivering a copy to the tenant personally; 
(2) by sending a copy through registered or certified mail addressed to 
the tenant at his place of residence; 
(3) if he is absent from his place of residence or from his usual place of 
business, by leaving a copy with a person of suitable age and discretion at 
539 
78-36-6 JUDICIAL CODE 
either place and mailing a copy to the tenant at the address of his place ( 
residence or place of business; or 
(4) if a person of suitable age or discretion cannot be found at the plao 
of residence, then by affixing a copy in a conspicuous place on the lease 
property. Service upon a subtenant may be made in the same manne 
History: L. 1951, ch. 58, § 1; C. 1943, 
Supp., 104-36-6; L. 1981, ch. 160, § 3; 1986, 
ch. 137, § 2; 1987, ch. 123, § 1. 
Amendment Notes . — The 1986 amend-
ment deleted the comma at the end of Subsec-
tion (3) and deleted "and also delivering a copy 
to a person there residing, if the person can be 
found, and also sending a copy through the 
mail addressed to the tenant at the place 
where the leased property is situated" at the 
end of the first sentence in Subsection (4). 
The 1987 amendment deleted "either" and a 
ANALYSIS 
Death of landlord. 
—Substitution of parties. 
Delay in bringing action. 
Improper service. 
—Failure to' mail. 
Leaving copy with spouse. 
—Failure to personally serve. 
Mail. 
Rules of Civil Procedure. 
—Effect. 
Strict statutory compliance. 
Death of landlord. 
—Substitution of pa r t i e s . 
Notice served by agent of landlord during his 
lifetime did not lose its force upon landlord's 
death in view of C.L. 1917, § 6513 permitting 
substitution of personal representative for de-
ceased, nor was executor under necessity of 
serving another demand for possession before 
bringing action, for he was entitled to carry on 
the litigation from point where original party 
left it. Boland v. Nihlros, 77 Utah 205, 293 P. 7 
(1930). 
Delay in bringing ac t ion. 
Mere lapse of time does not operate as an 
abandonment of all claim and demand under 
the notice; nor does mere delay in bringing 
suit, where explained, render demand for pos-
session of the premises of no force or effect. 
Boland v. Nihlros, 77 Utah 205, 293 P. 7 
(1930), an action in which six years elapsed 
between demand for possession on commence-
ment of action and in which there were delays 
in bringing suit to trial. 
comma following "may be served" in the intr 
ductory language; substituted "a person" f< 
"some person" and "mailing a copy" for "sem 
ing a copy through the mail addressed" an 
inserted "the address of" in Subsection (3); an 
deleted "the place of residence of business cai 
not be ascertained or" preceding "a person" an 
substituted "at the place of residence" f( 
"there" in the first sentence of Subsection (4 
Cross-References. — Service of proce* 
Rules 4, 5, U.R.C.P. 
Improper service. 
— Failure to mail. 
Leaving copy with spouse . 
An action for unlawful detainer cannot bt 
maintained against a tenant to whom no cop: 
of the notice required by the statute wa: 
mailed, although a copy was left with his wife 
Perkins v. Spencer, 121 Utah 468, 243 P.2< 
446 (1952). 
—Failure to personally serve . 
Mail. 
Assuming that compliance with this sectioi 
can be waived by defendant tenant, enterin 
general appearance cannot have that effect. 1 
was not a compliance with statute for landlorc 
after failing in a few attempts to find tenant 
a t home and serve them personally with notice 
to mail a copy of notice to quit, addressed t< 
them at their place of residence. Carstensen v 
Hansen, 107 Utah 234, 152 P.2d 954 (1944 
(decided under prior law). 
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Rules of Civil Procedure. 
—Effect. 
The general provisions of Rule 4, U.R.C.P., 
relating to service do not modify the provisions 
of this section, which specifically applies to ser-
vice in unlawful detainer actions. Ute-Cal 
Land Dev. v. Intermountain Stock Exch., 628 
P.2d 1278 (Utah 1981). 
Strict statutory compliance. 
To hold that any method of service other 
Am. Jur. 2d. — 50 Am. Jur. 2d,Landlord 
and Tenant § 1213. 
C.J.S. — 52A C.J.S. Landlord and Tenant 
§ 769(1) et seq. 
History: L. 1951, ch. 58, § 1; C. 1943, 
Supp., 104-36-7. 
Cross-References. — Necessary joinder of 
parties, Rule 19, U.R.C.P. 
ANALYSIS 
Liability of parties. 
—Intervenor. 
Necessary parties. 
—Agent of landlord. 
—Assignor of sales contract. 
Liability of parties. 
—Intervenor. 
A person not actually occupying the prem-
ises who intervenes in an action to obtain pos-
session and for damages for unlawful detainer, 
and who asserts ownership and the right to 
possession by the occupier as his tenant, may 
be guilty of unlawful detainer and liable for 
than that prescribed in the statute is sufficient 
to comply with it would be to nullify the inten-
tion of the legislature. Carstensen v. Hansen, 
107 Utah 234, 152 P.2d 954 (1944). 
Unlawful detainer being a summary proce-
dure, the statute must be strictly complied 
with in order to enforce the obligations im-
posed by it. Perkins v. Spencer, 121 Utah 468, 
243 P.2d 446 (1954), distinguished, Jensen v. 
Nielson, 26 Utah 2d 96, 485 P.2d 673 (1971). 
Key Numbers. — Landlord and Tenant «=* 
283. 
Nonsuit, dismissal of actions, Rule 41, 
U.R.C.P. 
treble damages where the court finds this in-
tervener's claim invalid. Tanner v. Lawler, 6 
Utah 84, 305 P.2d 882, modified on another 
point, 6 Utah 2d 268, 311 P.2d 791 (1957). 
Necessary parties. 
—Agent of landlord. 
Agent of landlord is not a necessary or 
COLLATERAL REFERENCES 
78-36-7- Necessary parties defendant. 
No person other than the tenant of the premises, and subtenant if there is 
one in the actual occupation of the premises when the action is commenced, 
need be made a party defendant in the proceeding, nor shall any proceeding 
abate, nor the plaintiff be nonsuited, for the nonjoinder of any person who 
might have been made a party defendant; but when it appears that any of the 
parties served with process or appearing in the proceedings are guilty, judg-
ment must be rendered against them. In case a person has become subtenant 
of the premises in controversy after the service of any notice in this chapter 
provided for, the fact that such notice was not served on such subtenant shall 
constitute no defense to the action. All persons who enter under the tenant 
after the commencement of the action hereunder shall be bound by the judg-
ment the same as if they had been made parties to the action. 
NOTES TO DECISIONS 
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proper party in forcible detainer proceeding, or make him a defendant in the unlawful de-
Dunbar v. Hansen, 68 Utah 398, 250 P. 982 tainer action since an action for unlawful de-
(1926). tainer is primarily against the person in pos-
—Assignor of sales contract session and it is not necessary for everyone 
It was not necessary for assignee of seller's having an interest to be made a party. Pearce 
interest in real estate sale contract to notify v. Shurtz, 2 Utah 2d 124, 270 P.2d 442 (1954) 
original purchaser of the forfeiture for default 
COLLATERAL REFERENCES 
Am. Jur. 2d. — 50 Am. Jur. 2d Landlord Key Numbers. — Landlord and Tenant «= 
and Tenant § 1236. 291(6). 
C.J.S. — 52A C.J.S. Landlord and Tenant 
§ 764. 
78-36-8- Allegations permitted in complaint — Time foi 
appearance — Service of summons. 
The plaintiff in his complaint, in addition to setting forth the facts on whict 
he seeks to recover, may set forth any circumstances of fraud, force, or vio 
lence which may have accompanied the alleged forcible entry, or forcible o 
unlawful detainer, and claim damages therefor or compensation for the occu 
pation of the premises, or both. If the unlawful detainer charged is aftei 
default in the payment of rent, the complaint shall state the amount of rem 
due. The court shall indorse on the summons the number of days within whicl 
the defendant is required to appear and defend the action, which shall not b< 
less than three or more than 20 days from the date of service. The court ma} 
authorize service by publication or mail for cause shown. Service by publica-
tion is complete one week after publication. Service by mail is complete three 
days after mailing. The summons shall be changed in form to conform to th< 
time of service as ordered, and shall be served as in other cases. 
History: L. 1951, ch, 58, § 1; C. 1943, sentence, which read 'The complaint shall b 
Supp., 104-36-8; 1987, ch. 123 § 2. filed within one day after service of summons 
Amendment Notes. — The 1987 amend- ifnot served therewith"; and made minor phra 
ment substituted "rent due" for "such rent" at
 s e o l a n d p u n c t u a t ion changes throughou 
the end of the second sentence; deleted except ^
 f d a n d t h i r d s e n t e n c e s 
when publication is necessarv, in which case ^ ' * ^ x t 
the court shall direct publication for a period of Cross-References — General rules c 
not less than one week" from the end of the pleadings, Rule 8, U.R.C.P. 
third sentence; added the present fourth, fifth, Service of summons, Rules 4, 5, U.R.C.P. 
and sixth sentences; deleted the former last 
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Necessary allegations and proof. 
—Date of notice to surrender. 
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Action to recover rent 
Plaintiff may bring action to recover rent 
due, and a separate action in unlawful detainer 
for recovery of possession and for damages. 
Judgment in one action will not bar action in 
the other proceeding, the issues in the two ac-
tions not being the same, and, therefore, not 
being adjudicated. Voyles v. Straka, 77 Utah 
171, 292 P. 913 (1930). 
Damages. 
—Right to demand. 
The plaintiff in his complaint may not only 
ask for possession of the premises, but also for 
damages accruing to trial. Forrester v. Cook, 
77 Utah 137, 292 P. 206 (1930). 
Dismissal. 
—Joint motion. 
Where complaint in forcible entry and de-
tainer action stated cause of action against one 
defendant, joint demurrer (now motion to dis-
miss) by two defendants was properly over-
ruled. Paxton v. Fisher, 86 Utah 408, 45 P.2d 
903 (1935). 
Necessary allegations and proof. 
Plaintiff must allege and prove, not only that 
he has right to property's possession, but also 
that property is being unlawfully detained 
from him, after notice to quit, served as pro-
vided by law. Barnes v. Cox, 12 Utah 47, 41 P. 
557 (1895). 
As a rule, all that is required to be alleged by 
plaintiff, in action of forcible entry and de-
tainer, is facts and circumstances constituting 
entry or detainer complained of, and either 
that he was peaceably in actual possession of 
premises at time of forcible entry, or, in some 
cases, that he was entitled to possession of 
premises at time of forcible detainer. Holladay 
Coal Co. v. Kirker, 20 Utah 192, 57 P. 882 
(1899). 
Plaintiff, in action of forcible entry and de-
tainer, need not allege his estate in or title to 
premises, nor, with few exceptions, is he re-
quired to allege his right of possession. 
Holladay Coal Co. v. Kirker, 20 Utah 192, 57 
P. 882 (1899). 
—Date of notice to surrender. 
In action of forcible entry and detainer, held 
that exact date on which notice to surrender 
premises was given was wholly immaterial, 
and that plaintiff was only required to aver 
and prove specific fact that, subsequent to time 
of unlawful entry, while defendants were in 
possession and prior to commencement of ac-
tion, sufficient notice was given and that sur-
render of premises by defendants was refused 
for period of three days thereafter. Holladay 
Coal Co. v. Kirker, 20 Utah 192, 57 P. 882 
(1899). 
COLLATERAL REFERENCES 
Am. Jur. 2d. — 35 Am. Jur. 2d Forcible 
Entry and Detainer § 38 et seq. 
C.J.S. — 36A C.J.S. Forcible Entry and De-
tainer §§ 39, 42, 44. 
Key Numbers. 
tainer «= 24. 
— Forcible Entry and De-
78-36-8.5. Possession bond of plaintiff — Alternative reme-
dies. 
(1) At any time between the filing of his complaint and the entry of final 
judgment, the plaintiff may execute and file a possession bond. The bond may 
be in the form of a corporate bond, a cash bond, certified funds, or a property 
bond executed by two persons who own real property in the state and who are 
not parties to the action. The court shall approve the bond in an amount that 
is the probable amount of costs of suit and damages which may result to the 
defendant if the suit has been improperly instituted. The bond shall be pay-
able to the clerk of the court for the benefit of the defendant for all costs and 
damages actually adjudged against the plaintiff. The plaintiff shall notify the 
defendant that he has filed a possession bond. This notice shall be served in 
the same manner as service of summons and shall inform the defendant of all 
of the alternative remedies and procedures under Subsection (2). 
(2) The following are alternative remedies and procedures applicable to an 
action if the plaintiff files a possession bond under Subsection (1): 
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(a) With respect to an unlawful detainer action based solely upon non-
payment of rent or utilities, the existing contract shall remain in force 
and the complaint shall be dismissed if the defendant, within three days 
of the service of the notice of the possession bond, pays accrued rent, 
utility charges, any late fee, and other costs, including attorney's fees, as 
provided in the rental agreement. 
(b) The defendant may remain in possession if he executes and files a 
counter bond in the form of a corporate bond, a cash bond, certified funds, 
or a property bond executed by two persons who own real property in the 
state and who are not parties to the action. The form of the bond is at the 
defendant's option. The bond shall be payable to the clerk of the court. 
The defendant shall file the bond prior to the expiration of three days 
from the date he is served with notice of the filing of plaintiffs possession 
bond. The court shall approve the bond in an amount that is the probable 
amount of costs of suit and actual damages that may result to the plaintifi 
if the defendant has improperly withheld possession. The court shall con-
sider prepaid rent to the owner as a portion of the defendant's total bond. 
(c) The defendant, upon demand, shall be granted a hearing to be helc 
prior to the expiration of three days from the date the defendant is serve* 
with notice of the filing of plaintiffs possession bond. 
(3) If the defendant does not elect and comply with a remedy under Subsec 
tion (2) within the required time, the plaintiff, upon ex parte motion, shall be 
granted an order of restitution. The constable of the precinct or the sheriff o 
the county where the property is situated shall return possession of the prop 
erty to the plaintiff promptly. 
(4) If the defendant demands a hearing under Subsection (2)(c), and if th< 
court rules after the hearing that the plaintiff is entitled to possession of th 
property, the constable or sheriff shall promptly return possession of the prof 
erty to the plaintiff. If at the hearing the court allows the defendant to remai 
in possession and further issues remain to be adjudicated between the partie 
the court shall require the defendant to post a bond as required in Subsectic 
(2)(b). If at the hearing the court rules that all issues between the parties ca 
be adjudicated without further court proceedings, the court shall, upon adjud 
eating those issues, enter judgment on the merits. 
History: C. 1953, 78-36-8.5, enacted by L. Cross-References. — Contracts of sure! 
1981, ch. 160, § 4; L. 1983, ch. 209, § 1; 1987, ship, § 31A-22-101 et seq. 
ch. 123, § 3. County sheriff, Chapter 22 of Title 17. 
Amendment Notes. — The 1987 amend- Service of summons, Rules 4, 5, U.R.CJ 
ment rewrote this section to the extent that a 
detailed analysis is impracticable. 
78-36-9, Proof required by plaintiff — Defense-
On the trial of any proceeding for any forcible entry or forcible detainer t 
plaintiff shall only be required to show, in addition to the forcible entry 
forcible detainer complained of, that he was peaceably in the actual possess! 
at the time of the forcible entry, or was entitled to the possession at the time 
the forcible detainer. The defendant may show in his defense that he or i 
ancestors, or those whose interest in such premises he claims, had been in * 
quiet possession thereof for the space of one whole year continuously n( 
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before the commencement of the proceedings, and that his interest therein is 
not then ended or determined; and such showing is a bar to the proceedings. 
History: L. 1951, ch. 58, § 1; C. 1943, Cross-References. — Limitation of actions, 
Supp., 104-36-9. real property, § 78-12-2 et seq. 
NOTES TO DECISIONS 
ANALYSIS 
Defenses and counterclaims. 
—Tenant. 
Counterclaim. 
—Tender of rent. 
Possession. 
—Constructive. 
Right of entry. 
—Public land. 
Security interest in personal property. 
—Partial possession of premises. 
Title adjudication. 
—Color of title. 
State lease. 
—Deed. 
Fraud and duress. 
—Tax title. 
Defenses and counterclaims. 
—Tenant 
Counterclaim. 
Defendant in forcible detainer action cannot 
file counterclaim, and is limited to defenses 
predicated on nonexistence of relationship of 
landlord and tenant between parties, nonexis-
tence of valid lease or contract to pay rent, or 
that no rent is due; but he may bring suit in 
court of equity to determine rights and enjoin 
forcible detainer proceeding pending such de-
termination. Dunbar v. Hansen, 68 Utah 398, 
250 P. 982 (1926) (decided under prior law). 
Under Rule 13, U.R.C.P., counterclaim alleg-
ing misrepresentation and fraud concerning 
the contract of purchase of the involved prop-
erty could be asserted by defendants in an un-
lawful detainer action. White v. District Court, 
232 P.2d 785 (Utah 1951). 
—Tender of r en t 
A tender by tenant of rent, if insufficient in 
amount, is no tender at all, and the fact that 
subsequent tenders were, in the aggregate, 
equivalent to the rent due, will not make the 
tender sufficient and valid. Commercial Block 
Realty Co. v. Merchants' Protective Ass'n, 71 
Utah 505, 267 P. 1009 (1928). 
Possession. 
—Constructive. 
Right of entry. 
Under an allegation of possession plaintiff 
can show constructive possession, in that it is 
an association of qualified persons in posses-
sion of coal mines upon which sufficient money 
has been expended to give a preference right of 
entry to 640 acres of surrounding land under 
the law. Holladay Coal Co. v. Kirker, 20 Utah 
192, 57 P. 882 (1899). 
—Public land. 
Possession of public land is prima facie evi-
dence of right to possession as against a mere 
intruder or trespasser. Wilson v. Triumph 
Consol. Mining Co., 19 Utah 66, 56 P. 300, 75 
Am. St. R. 718 (1899). 
Security interest in personal property. 
—Partial possession of premises. 
Plaintiffs security interest in bar equipment 
did not constitute partial possession of prem-
ises, and plaintiff could not maintain action for 
forcible entry or for wrongful eviction. 
Wangsgard v. Fitzpatrick, 542 P.2d 194 (Utah 
1975). 
Title adjudication. 
In action for possession and damages for un-
lawful detention of farm lands, trial court 
erred in rendering judgment and decree in de-
fendant's favor quieting title to premises, since 
question of title is not ordinarily involved in 
such actions. Welling v. Abbott, 52 Utah 240, 
173 P. 245 (1918). 
It is not proper to quiet title to real estate in 
action of forcible entry or in action for unlaw-
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ful detainer. Thomson v. Reynolds, 53 Utah tainer proceedings to try title or equities be-
437, 174 P. 164 (1918). tween parties, so that, in such an action, defen-
Color of title. ^ a n t w a s n o t permitted to show that deed exe-
cuted by him to plaintiff was obtained from 
-—ota . e ease. him by means of fraud and duress since such 
In suit for foible entry .t was proper to
 d e f e n s e woM c o n s t i t u t e a n a t t e t to d i 
introduce lease from State Land Board (now . ,. ,, .... „,.„. „ / ««-
 Tr. , 
Board of State Lands) to plaintiffs to show that ! ^ d 1 ^ ' ^ % ^ " i ^ V* ' ^ 
they held under color of title and that it was 304> l61 *' n i ( 1 9 2 5 ) ' 
necessary for defendants to resort to statute to Tax title S l f ^ f S oT L°iV ™ ? V' D e a r d o n ' 9 4 U t a h " Affirmative defense and counterclaim set-149, 76 P.2d 561 (1938).
 U n g u p tflX t i U e a n d s e e k i n g to h a v e p r o p € r t v 
—Deed. in question quieted in defendant, held not to lie 
Fraud and duress. m f°rcible detainer action. Woodbury v. 
It is not intention of forcible entry and de- Bunker, 98 Utah 216, 98 P.2d 948 (1940). 
COLLATERAL REFERENCES 
Am. Jur. 2d. — 35 Am. Jur. 2d Forcible Key Numbers. — Forcible Entry and De-
Entry and Detainer §§ 42 to 44. tainer «=» 29. 
C.J.S. — 36A C.J.S. Forcible Entry and De-
tainer § 53 et seq. 
78-36-10, Judgment for restitution, damages, and rent — 
Immediate enforcement — Treble damages. 
(1) A judgment may be entered upon the merits or upon default. A judg-
ment entered in favor of the plaintiff shall include an order for the restitution 
of the premises. If the proceeding is for unlawful detainer after neglect or 
failure to perform any condition or covenant of the lease or agreement under 
which the property is held, or after default in the payment of rent, the judg-
ment shall also declare the forfeiture of the Tease or agreement. 
(2) The jury or the court, if the proceeding is tried without a jury or upon 
the defendant's default, shall also assess the damages resulting to the plaintiff 
from any of the following: 
(a) forcible entry; 
(b) forcible or unlawful detainer; 
(c) waste of the premises during the defendant's tenancy, if waste is 
alleged in the complaint and proved at trial; and 
(d) the amount of rent due, if the alleged unlawful detainer is after 
default in the payment of rent. 
(3) The judgment shall be entered against the defendant for the rent, for 
three times the amount of the damages assessed under Subsections (2)(a) 
through (2)(c), and for reasonable attorney's fees, if they are provided for in 
the lease or agreement. 
(4) If the proceeding is for unlawful detainer after default in the payment of 
the rent, execution upon the judgment shall be issued immediately after the 
entry of the judgment. In all cases, the judgment may be issued and enforced 
immediately. 
History: L. 1951, ch. 58, § 1; C. 1943, vided the former first sentence into the present 
Supp., 104-36-10; L. 1981, ch. 160, § 5; 1987, second and third sentences of Subsection (1) by 
ch. 123, § 4. deleting "and" and making a related punctua-
Amendment Notes. — The 1987 amend- tion change; added the present first sentence of 
ment divided the section into subsections; di- Subsection (1); rewrote the second sentence of 
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Subsection (1); inserted "or upon the defen-
dant's default", substituted "resulting" for "oc-
casioned" and "from any of the following" for 
"by any" and made punctuation changes in 
Subsection (2); deleted "or by any" and made a 
punctuation change in Subsection (2)(a); de-
leted "and any amount found due the plaintiff 
by reason o f and made a punctuation change 
in Subsection (2)(b); substituted "during the 
defendant's tenancy, if waste is" for "by the 
defendant during the tenancy," and "at trial; 
and" for "on the trial, and find" in Subsection 
(2)(c); deleted "any" preceding "rent due" and 
"and" from the end, and made a punctuation 
change in Subsection (l)(d); substituted "en-
tered" for "rendered", a comma for "and" fol-
lowing "for the rent", and the language begin-
ANALYSIS 
Damages 
—Loss of value. 
—Nominal damages. 
—Rent and profits. 
—Treble damages. 
Execution upon judgment. 
—Failure to pay rent. 
Grace period. 
—Attempt to use. 
Real estate sale contracts. 
—Liquidated damages. 
Separate action for rent. 
Statutory remedy. 
—Tort liability for noncompliance. 
Damages. 
—Loss of value. 
The loss of the value of the use and occupa-
tion of the premises, during the period when 
the premises were unlawfully withheld from 
plaintiff, is "damage" suffered. Forrester v. 
Cook, 77 Utah 137, 292 P. 206 (1930). 
—Nominal damages. 
Where husband and wife occupy the prem-
ises, and the notice required by statute is 
served only on the wife so that an action for 
unlawful detainer can be maintained merely 
against her, the successful plaintiff is entitled 
to nominal damages only, since, even if the 
wife had moved, the plaintiff would have had 
no right to possession of the premises as 
against the husband, and he thus suffered no 
actual damage by reason of the fact that the 
wife remained there. Perkins v. Spencer, 121 
Utah 468, 243 P.2d 446 (1952), distinguished, 
Carlson v. Hamilton, 8 Utah 2d 272, 332 P.2d 
989 (1958). 
ning "assessed under Subsections (2)(a)" for 
"thus assessed" and deleted "guilty of the forc-
ible entry, or forcible or unlawful detainer," 
following "against the defendant" in Subsec-
tion (3)"; substituted "If for "When" at the 
beginning of Subsection (4); deleted "an" pre-
ceding "unlawful detainer" and "execution 
upon the judgment shall be issued immediately 
after the entry of the judgement" plus a comma 
following "payment of the rent" in the first 
sentence of Subsection (4); and inserted "issued 
and" and made a punctuation change in the 
second sentence of Subsection (4). 
Cross-References. — Fees of constable, 
§ 21-3-3. 
Fees of sheriff, § 21-2-4. 
—Rent and profits. 
Damages recoverable must be the natural 
and proximate consequences of the unlawful 
detainer and nothing more. Rents and profits, 
or rental value of the premises, during deten-
tion are included in damages. Rental value or 
reasonable value of the use and occupation of 
the premises becomes an element of damages 
for retaining possession. This is not rent, it is 
damages. Forrester v. Cook, 77 Utah 137, 292 
P. 206 (1930). 
This section was not designed to provide a 
summary remedy for the recovery of rent. The 
language thereof that "judgment shall be ren-
dered ...for the rent," etc., is applicable only 
when rent is claimed in the complaint for it 
would be improper in any case to award a judg-
ment for what is not so claimed. Voyles v. 
Straka, 77 Utah 171, 292 P. 913 (1930). 
—Treble damages. 
After the termination of the tenancy by no-
tice to quit, the person in unlawful possession 
is not owing rent under contract, but must re-
spond in damages. This is not rent, but "dam-
NOTES TO DECISIONS 
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ages," and, therefore, may be trebled. Forrester 
v. Cook, 77 Utah 137, 292 P. 206 (1930). 
Where all issues were decided in plaintiffs 
favor, trial court's refusal to treble damages, 
awarded plaintiff by jury, was error. Eccles v. 
Union Pac. Coal Co., 15 Utah 14, 48 P. 148 
(1897). 
Plaintiffs failure to comply with the provi-
sions of § 78-36-8 converted his action for un-
lawful detainer into one at common law for 
ejectment and defeated his right under this 
section to treble damages. Pingree v. Continen-
tal Group of Utah, Inc., 558 P.2d 1317. (Utah 
1976). 
A person not actually occupying the prem-
ises who intervenes in an action to obtain pos-
session and for damages for unlawful detainer, 
and who asserts ownership and the right to 
possession by the occupier as his tenant, may 
be guilty of unlawful detainer and liable for 
treble damages where the court finds this in-
tervener's claim invalid. Tanner v. Lawler, 6 
Utah 2d 84, 305 P.2d 882, modified on another 
point, 6 Utah 2d 268, 311 P.2d 791 (1957). 
Where tenant merely remains over upon ter-
mination of lease and increase in rent, but does 
not contest landlord's right to terminate lease 
or his right to possession, tenant is conclu-
sively presumed to have acquiesced in in-
creased rental and landlord is not entitled to 
treble damages. Belnap v. Fox, 69 Utah 15, 251 
P. 1073 (1926). 
The provision for treble damages is highly 
penal, and, therefore, subject to strict construc-
tion. It will be observed that only damages are 
to be trebled, not rents and waste. But the lan-
guage is mandatory making it compulsory 
upon the court to render and enter judgment 
for three times the amount of the damages as-
sessed, after a finding of damages by the jury. 
And rents which may not be trebled are such 
as accrue before termination of the tenancy. 
Forrester v. Cook, 77 Utah 137, 292 P. 206 
(1930). 
Execution upon judgment. 
—Failure to pay rent. 
When landlord prevails in unlawful detainer 
action because of tenant's failure to pay rent 
under a lease which has not expired, he cannot 
have any judgment unless he shows that there 
is rent due and the amount thereof; when that 
is done, the tenant has five days in which to 
pay the judgment and costs, and then he will 
be restored to the premises under his lease. 
The landlord cannot prevent the tenant from 
paying the judgment and regaining his rights 
under the unexpired lease by the device of fail-
ing to have the amount of rent due included in 
the judgment In such a case unless the judg-
ment determines the amount of rent due, it is 
defective, and the restitution part cannot be 
lawfully enforced. Monter v. Kratzers Spe-
cialty Bread Co., 29 Utah 2d 18, 504 P.2d 40 
(1972). 
Grace period. 
—Attempt to use. 
Where evicted lessees asserted that they 
were not afforded the five-day post-judgment 
grace period to pay the delinquency and pre-
serve the lease, the issue was moot since the 
defendants did not make an attempt to take 
advantage of the grace period. Allred v. Smith, 
674 P.2d 99 (Utah 1983) (decided under facts 
existing prior to 1981 amendment). 
Real estate sale contracts. 
—Liquidated damages. 
By common practice in Utah, an action in 
unlawful detainer may be brought against a 
vendee of realty whose payments are far in ar-
rears, after sufficient demands for payment 
have been made and subsequent notice to quit 
has been given by vendor; where a vendor does 
cancel the contract for sale and bring such an 
action, vendee may be required, if the contract 
so provides, to forfeit as liquidated damages all 
money theretofore paid to the vendor along 
with all improvements placed on the land by 
the vendee, unless such forfeiture would be un-
conscionable. Weyher v. Peterson, 16 Utah 2d 
278, 399 P.2d 438 (1965). 
Separate action for rent. 
Judgment in unlawful detainer for restitu-
tion of the premises and for treble damages 
does not bar action to recover rent due, rent not 
being claimed or adjudged in the possessory 
action, because the right to recover possession 
by summary remedy, and the claim for rent, do 
not constitute one entire and indivisible cause 
of action. Voyles v. Straka, 77 Utah 171, 292 P. 
913 (1930). 
Statutory remedy. 
—Tort liability for noncompliance. 
A landlord who is entitled to possession 
must, on the refusal of the tenant to surrender 
the premises, resort to the remedy given by 
law to secure it. A violation of that dujty set by 
the statute gives rise to an action for damages, 
not in an action under the forcible entry and 
detainer statute but as a separate tort. King v. 
Firm, 3 Utah 2d 419, 285 P.2d 1114 (1955). 
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COLLATERAL REFERENCES 
Utah Law Review. — Forfeiture Under In-
stallment Land Contracts in Utah, 1981 Utah 
L. Rev. 803, 807. 
Am. Jur. 2d. — 35 Am. Jur. 2d Forcible 
Entry and Detainer § 53. 
C.J.S. — 36A C.J.S. Forcible Entry and De-
tainer § 68 et seq. 
78-36-11. Time for appeal-
Either party may, within ten days, 
History: L. 1951, ch. 58, § 1; C. 1943, 
Supp., 104-36-11. 
ANALYSIS 
Applicability of section. 
—Held applicable. 
—Held inapplicable. 
Failure to comply. 
—Loss of jurisdiction. 
Applicability of section. 
—Held applicable. 
Fact that demurrer to complaint required 
trial court to construe written instrument to 
determine whether plaintiff was entitled to 
any relief did not change action from one of 
unlawful detainer, so that it was necessary to 
take appeal within ten days as provided by this 
section. Madsen v. Chournos, 102 Utah 247, 
129 P.2d 986 (1942). 
Appeal from dismissal of unlawful detainer 
action for failure to amend complaint within 
time allowed was governed by this section. 
Madsen v. Chournos, 102 Utah 247, 129 P.2d 
986 (1942). 
Time for taking appeal in forcible entry and 
detainer suit was governed by this section, 
which is valid, and general provision providing 
for appeals was not applicable. Hunsaker v. 
Harris, 37 Utah 226, 109 P. 1 (1910). 
A party had ten days, as provided by this 
section, and not one month, as provided by for-
mer Rule 73(a), U.R.C.P., in which to appeal 
from a judgment for unlawful detainer. Ute-
Cal Land Dev. v. Intermountain Stock Exch., 
628 P.2d 1278 (Utah 1981). 
Fact that judgment rested on construction of 
whether lease was terminated upon sale of 
property did not change action from one in un-
lawful detainer, so that it was necessary to 
take appeal within ten days as provided by this 
A.L.R. — Landlord and tenant: respective 
rights in excess rent when landlord relets at 
higher rent during lessee's term, 50 A.L.R.4th 
403. 
Key Numbers. — Forcible Entry and De-
tainer «=» 38. 
appeal from the judgment rendered. 
Cross-References. — Stay of execution 
pending appeal, Rule 62, U.R.C.P. 
section. Brandley v. Lewis, 97 Utah 217, 92 
P.2d 338 (1939). 
—Held inapplicable. 
Where a complaint contained two causes of 
action asking for treble damages for forcible 
entry and detainer, one cause of action for a 
temporary restraining order and temporary in-
junction, and a fourth cause of action for dam-
ages for breach of a lease; the hybrid nature of 
the plaintiffs action prevented this statute 
from controlling the time limitation for filing 
an appeal. Fashions Four v. Fashion Place 
Assocs., 681 P.2d 830 (Utah 1984). 
Where plaintiff in forcible detainer action 
was held liable on counterclaim, time for ap-
peal was not governed by ten-day limitation of 
this section, but by general six-month statute, 
ten-day limit of this section being applicable 
only to judgments in forcible detainer. Dunbar 
v. Hansen, 68 Utah 398, 250 P. 982 (1926). 
Ten-day period for appeal provided in forc-
ible entry and detainer cases was inapplicable 
to appeal from money judgment entered for 
landlord after recovery of possession, six-
month period of general statute being applica-
ble. Belnap v. Fox, 69 Utah 15, 251 P. 1073 
(1926). 
Where, in first count, plaintiff sought to re-
cover possession of real estate, and in second 
count sought to quiet title to certain land ad-
joining property involved in first cause of ac-
tion, and it appeared that case was tried as 
NOTES TO DECISIONS 
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action in equity, plaintiff could not defeat ap-
peal by contending that action was one of forc-
ible detainer. Ottenheimer v. Mountain States 
Supply Co., 56 Utah 190, 188 P. 1117 (1920). 
Failure to comply. 
—Loss of jurisdiction. 
Where judgment was entered against appel-
COLLATERAL REFERENCES 
Am. Jur. 2d. — 35 Am. Jur. 2d Forcible Key Numbers. — Forcible Entry and De-
Entry and Detainer § 55. tainer <fc* 43. 
C.J.S. — 36A CJ.S. Forcible Entry and De-
tainer § 90. 
78-36-12. Exclusion of tenant without judicial process pro-
hibited — Abandoned premises excepted. 
It is unlawful for an owner to willfully exclude a tenant from the tenant's 
premises in any manner except by judicial process, provided, an owner or his 
agent shall not be prevented from removing the contents of the leased prem-
ises under Subsection 78-36-12.6(2) and retaking the premises and attempting 
to rent them at a fair rental value when the tenant has abandoned the prem-
ises. 
History: C. 1953, 78-36-12, enacted by L. 
1981, ch. 160, § 6. 
COLLATERAL REFERENCES 
A.L.R. Landlord and tenant: respective higher rent during lessee's term, 50 A.L.R.4th 
rights in excess rent when landlord relets at 403. 
78-36-12.3- Definitions. 
(1) "Willful exclusion" means preventing the tenant from entering into the 
premises with intent to deprive the tenant of such entry. 
(2) "Owner" means the actual owner of the premises and shall also have the 
same meaning as landlord under common law and the statutes of this state. 
(3) "Abandonment" is presumed in either of the following situations: 
(a) The tenant has not notified the owner that he or she will be absent 
from the premises, and the tenant fails to pay rent within 15 days after 
the due date, and there is no reasonable evidence other than the presence 
of the tenant's personal property that the tenant is occupying the prem-
ises; or 
(b) The tenant has not notified the owner that he or she will be absent 
from the premises, and the tenant fails to pay rent when due and the 
tenant's personal property has been removed from the dwelling unit and 
there is no reasonable evidence that the tenant is occupying the premises. 
lants on July 1 and they did not file notice of 
appeal until July 15, appeal was not timely 
filed and Supreme Court was without jurisdic-
tion to hear it. Coombs v. Johnson, 26 Utah 2d 
8, 484 P.2d 155 (1971). 
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History: C. 1953, 78-36-12.3, enacted by L. 
1981, ch. 160, § 7. 
78-36-12.6. Abandoned premises — Retaking and 
rerenting by owner — Liability of tenant — Per-
sonal property of tenant left on premises. 
(1) In the event of abandonment the owner may retake the premises and 
attempt to rent them at a fair rental value and the tenant who abandoned the 
premises shall be liable: 
(a) for the entire rent due for the remainder of the term; or 
(b) for rent accrued during the period necessary to re-rent the premises 
at a fair rental value, plus the difference between the fair rental value 
and the rent agreed to in the prior rental agreement, plus a reasonable 
commission for the renting of the premises and the costs, if any, necessary 
to restore the rental unit to its condition when rented by the tenant less 
normal wear and tear. This subsection applies, if less than Subsection (a) 
notwithstanding that the owner did not re-rent the premises. 
(2) If the tenant has abandoned the premises and has left personal property 
on the premises, the owner is entitled to remove the property from the dwell-
ing, store it for the tenant, and recover actual moving and storage costs from 
the tenant. The owner shall make reasonable efforts to notify the tenant of the 
location of the personal property; however, if the property has been in storage 
for over 30 days and the tenant has made no reasonable effort to recover it, 
the owner may sell the property and apply the proceeds toward any amount 
the tenant owes. Any money left over from the sale of the property shall be 
handled as specified in § 78-44-18. Nothing contained in this act shall be in 
derogation of or alter the owner's rights under Chapter 3, Title 38. 
History: C. 1953, 78-36-12.6, enacted by L. Meaning of "this act". — The term "this 
1981, ch. 160, § 8; 1986, ch. 194, § 20. act," referred to in Subsection (2), means Laws 
Amendment Notes. — The 1986 amend- 1981, Chapter 160, which appears as 
ment moved the Subsection (1) designation to §§ 78-36-3, 78-36-4, 78-36-6, 78-36-8.5, 
the beginning of the section and made minor 78-36-10, 78-36-12 and 78-36-12.3. 
word and stylistic changes; and in Subsection Cross-References. — Residential renters' 
(2) substituted «§ 78-44-18" for «§ 78-44-11"
 d ^ C h ter 1 7 o f T i t l e 5 7 
and made minor word and stylistic changes. 
COLLATERAL REFERENCES 
A.L.R. — Landlord and tenant: respective higher rent during lessee's term, 50 A.L.R.4th 
rights in excess rent when landlord relets at 403. 
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Rule 6- Time. 
(a) Computation. In computing any period of time prescribed or allowed by 
these rules, by the local rules of any district court, by order of court, or by any 
applicable statute, the day of the act, event, or default from which the desig-
nated period of time begins to run shall not be included. The last day of the 
period so computed shall be included, unless it is a Saturday, a Sunday, or a 
legal holiday, in which event the period runs until the end of the next day 
which is not a Saturday, a Sunday, or a legal holiday. When the period of time 
prescribed or allowed is less than seven days, intermediate Saturdays, Sun-
days- and legal holidays shall be excluded in the computation. 
(b) Enlargement When by these rules or by a notice given thereunder or 
by order of the court an act is required or allowed to be done at or within a 
specified time, the court for cause shown may at any time in its discretion (1) 
with or without motion or notice order the period enlarged if request therefor 
is made before the expiration of the period originally prescribed or as ex-
tended by a previous order or (2) upon motion made after the expiration of th -* 
specified period permit the act to be done where the failure to act was the 
result of excusable neglect; but it may not extend the time for taking any 
action under Rules 50(b), 52(b), 59(b), (d) and (e), 60(b) and 73(a) and (g), 
except to the extent and under the conditions stated in them. 
(c) Unaffected by expiration of term. The period of time provided for the 
doing of any act or the taking of any proceeding is not affected or limited by 
the continued existence or expiration of a term of court. The continued exis-
tence or expiration of a term of court in no way affects the power of a court to 
do any act or take any proceeding in any civil action which has been pending 
before it. 
(d) For motions — Affidavits. A written motion, other than one which 
may be heard ex parte, and notice of the hearing thereof shall be served not 
later than 5 days before the time specified for the hearing, unless a different 
period is fixed by these rules or by order of the court. Such an order may for 
cause shown be made on ex parte application. When a motion is supported by 
affidavit, the affidavit shall be served with the motion; and, except as other-
wise provided in Rule 59(c), opposing affidavits may be served not later than 1 
day before the hearing, unless the court permits them to be served at some 
other time. 
(e) Additional time after service by mail. Whenever a party has the 
right or is required to do some act or take some proceedings within a pre-
scribed period after the service of a notice or other paper upon him and the 
notice or paper is served upon him by mail, 3 days shall be added to the 
prescribed period. 
Compiler's Notes. — Tins rule is substan-
tially similar to Rule 6, F R C P 
Rule 73, cited near the end of Subdivision 
(b), was repealed upon adoption of the Rules of 
the Appellate Procedure 
Cross-References. — Amendment to plead-
ings to conform to evidence, time of motion for, 
Rule 15(b) 
Commencement of action, time of service, 
Rule 4(b) 
Corporation or association, mailing of pro-
cess to, Rule 4(e)(5). 
Depositions, objections to errors and irregu-
larities, Rule 32(d). 
Discharge of attachment or release of prop-
erty, Rule 64C(f) 
Documents for state or subdivision, filing 
date on weekend or holiday, § 63-37-3 
Election laws, Sundays included in computa-
tion of time, § 20-1-12 
Failure of term or vacancy in office of judge, 
proceeding not affected, § 78-7-21 
Jury venire, service by mail, § 78-46-13 
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Advisory Committee Note. — Rule 4(b) is court. If the motions are not filed in a timely 
added to the list of those rules that the appel- manner, the appellant may not take advantage 
late court may not suspend. The former list of of Rule 4(b) that allows 30 days from the dispo-
rules that the appellate court could not sua- sition of the motion to file the appeal. Both 
pend concerned procedures and time limits appellate courts treat the failure to file post-
that confer jurisdiction upon the court. Under judgment motions in a timely manner as a ju-
Rule 4(b), the post-judgment motions listed risdictional defect. Burgers v. Meredith, 652 
must be filed in a timely manner in the trial P.2d 1320 (Utah 1982). 
NOTES TO DECISIONS 
Timely filing. sion of the time limitation contained in Rule 
When a motion for summary disposition was 10, Utah R. App. P. Bailey v. Adams, 798 P.2d 
clearly meritorious, it would support a suspen- 1142 (Utah Ct. App. 1990). 
TITLE II. 
APPEALS FROM JUDGMENTS AND ORDERS OF 
TRIAL COURTS. 
Rule 3. Appeal as of right: how taken. 
(a) Filing appeal from final orders and judgments. An appeal may be 
taken from a district, juvenile, or circuit court to the appellate court with 
jurisdiction over the appeal from all final orders and judgments, except as 
otherwise provided by law, by filing a notice of appeal with the clerk of the 
trial court within the time allowed by Rule 4. Failure of an appellant to take 
any step other than the timely filing of a notice of appeal does not affect the 
validity of the appeal, but is ground only for such action as the appellate court 
deems appropriate, which may include dismissal of the appeal or other sanc-
tions short of dismissal, as well as the award of attorney fees. 
(b) Joint or consolidated appeals. If two or more parties are entitled to 
appeal from a judgment or order and their interests are such as to make 
joinder practicable, they may file a joint notice of appeal or may join in an 
appeal of another party after filing separate timely notices of appeal. Joint 
appeals may proceed as a single appeal with a single appellant. Individual 
appeals may be consolidated by order of the appellate court upon its own 
motion or upon motion of a party, or by stipulation of the parties to the 
separate appeals. 
(c) Designation of parties. The party taking the appeal shall be known as 
the appellant and the adverse party as the appellee. The title of the action or 
proceeding shall not be changed in consequence of the appeal, except where 
otherwise directed by the appellate court. In original proceedings in the appel-
late court, the party making the original application shall be known as the 
petitioner and any other party as the respondent. 
(d) Content of notice of appeal. The notice of appeal shall specify the 
party or parties taking the appeal; shall designate the judgment or order, or 
part thereof, appealed from; shall designate the court from which the appeal is 
taken; and shall designate the court to which the appeal is taken. 
(e) Service of notice of appeal. The party taking the appeal shall give 
notice of the filing of a notice of appeal by serving personally or mailing a copy 
thereof to counsel of record of each party to the judgment or order; or, if the 
426 
UTAH RULES OF APPELLATE PROCEDURE Rule 3 
party is not represented by counsel, then on the party at the party's last 
known address. 
(0 Filing and docketing fees in civil appeals. At the time of filing any 
notice of separate, joint, or cross appeal in a civil case, the party taking the 
appeal shall pay to the clerk of the trial court such filing fees as are estab-
lished by law, and also the fee for docketing the appeal in the appellate court. 
The clerk of the trial court shall not accept a notice of appeal unless the filing 
and docketing fees are paid. 
(g) Docketing of appeal. Upon the filing of the notice of appeal and pay-
ment of the required fees, the clerk of the trial court shall immediately trans-
mit one copy of the notice of appeal, showing the date of its filing, together 
with the docketing fee, to the clerk of the appellate court. Upon receipt of the 
copy of the notice of appeal and the docketing fee, the clerk of the appellate 
court shall enter the appeal upon the docket. An appeal shall be docketed 
under the title given to the action in the trial court, with the appellant identi-
fied as such, but if the title does not contain the name of the appellant, such 
name shall be added to the title. 
Advisory Committee Note. — The designa-
tion of parties is changed to conform to the des-
ignation of parties in the federal appellate 
courts. 
The rule is amended to make clear that the 
mere designation of an appeal as a "cross-ap-
pear does not eliminate liability for payment 
of the filing and docketing fees. But for the 
ANALYSIS 
Absence of record. 
Attorney fees. 
Denial of intervention. 
Dismissal by trial court. 
Piling fees. 
Piling of notice. 
Final order or judgment. 
Judgment nunc pro tunc. 
Motion to strike. 
New trial. 
Partial judgment. 
Postjudgment orders. 
Purpose of notice. 
Review in equity cases. 
Summary judgment. 
Unsigned minute entry. 
Compiler's Notes. — All of the following 
annotations are taken from cases decided un-
der former Rule 3, R. Utah S. Ct. 
Absence of record. 
There was nothing for the court to review 
where the alleged error was not made part of 
the record. Powers v. Gene's Bldg. Materials, 
Inc., 567 P.2d 174 (Utah 1977). 
Attorney fees. 
Where plaintiff was entitled to attorney fees 
order of filing, the cross-appellant would have 
been the appellant and so should be required to 
pay the established fees. 
Cross-References. — Circuit courts, ap-
peals from, § 78-4-11. 
Justice courts, appeals from, § 78-5-120. 
Juvenile courts, appeals from § 78-3a-51. 
by law, he was entitled to attorney fees in-
curred on appeal in defending his judgment 
without the necessity of having to file a cross 
appeal. Coates v. American Economy Ins. Co., 
627 P.2d 92 (Utah 1981); Wallia v. Thomas, 
632 P.2d 39 (Utah 1981). 
Denial of intervention. 
Order denying with prejudice an application 
for intervention was appealable. Tracy v. Uni-
versity of Utah Hosp., 619 P.2d 340 (Utah 
1980). 
Dismissal by trial court. 
Both an order to dismiss with prejudice, on 
the merits of the issues under Rule 41(b), 
U.R.C.P., and an order of dismissal without 
prejudice under Rule 41(a)(1), U.R.C.P., are 
final abjudications of the issues and the time 
for appeal under this rule begins to run with 
the entry of the order. Steiner v. State, 27 Utah 
2d 284, 495 P.2d 809 (1972). 
Denial of defendant's motion to dismiss was 
not a final judgment subject to appeal. Little v. 
Mitchell, 604 P.2d 918 (Utah 1979). 
Dismissal without prejudice of plaintiffs ac-
tion was appealable where the trial court's rul-
ing went to the legal merits of any cause that 
plaintiff may have framed. Bowles v. State ex 
NOTES TO DECISIONS 
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rel. Department of Transp., 652 P.2d 1345 
(Utah 1982). 
Filing fees. 
It is not the clerk's duty to file notice of ap-
peal until he has received the appropriate fil-
ing fee. McLain v. Conrad, 19 Utah 2d 346, 431 
P.2d 571 (1967). 
Where the notice of appeal was left at the 
clerk's office prior to the expiration of the time 
for filing but the filing fee was not paid until 
after expiration of the time for filing and the 
clerk did not file the notice until the fee was 
paid, the notice was untimely filed and the 
court lacked jurisdiction to hear the appeal. 
McLain v. Conrad, 19 Utah 2d 346, 431 P.2d 
571 (1967). 
Filing of notice. 
Where the deadline for filing an appeal ex-
pired on Saturday, the notice of appeal which 
was filed on the following Monday was within 
the time limit, in view of the provisions of 
S 17-16-9. Transwe8tern Gen. Agency v. Mor-
gan, 526 P.2d 1186 (Utah 1974). 
Without notice of appeal being given, the Su-
preme Court is without jurisdiction to hear the 
matter. Yost v. State, 640 P.2d 1044 (Utah 
1981). 
The Supreme Court cannot take jurisdiction 
over an appeal which is not timely brought be-
fore it; and an untimely appeal will be dis-
missed for lack of jurisdiction. Burgers v. 
Maiben, 652 P.2d 1320 (Utah 1982); Bowen v. 
Riverion City, 656 P.2d 434 (Utah 1982); Nel-
son v. Stoker, 669 P.2d 390 (Utah 1983). 
Mailing a notice of appeal to the clerk of the 
court does not constitute a "filing" of the notice 
of appeal under this rule. Isaacson v. Don us, 
669 P.2d 849 (Utah 1983). 
Final order or judgment. 
An oral finding of contempt of court and sen-
tence of 15 days in the county jail, with 10 days 
suspended, was not a final judgment from 
which an appeal could have been taken. 
Hinkins v. Santi, 25 Utah 2d 324, 481 P.2d 53 
(1971). 
In the case of a divorce decree which did not, 
by its terms, become a final judgment until 
three months after it was entered, appeal had 
nonetheless to be taken within one month of 
the decree, which was the last proceeding nec-
essary before the judgment became final. 
Kessimakis v. Kessimakis, 546 P.2d 888 (Utah 
1976). 
A judgment is final when it ends the contro-
versy between the parties litigant. Salt Lake 
City Corp. v. Layton, 600 P.2d 538 (Utah 
1979). 
Order finding person in contempt was an ap-
pealable order. Salzetti v. Backman, 638 P.2d 
543 (Utah 1981). 
District court orders requiring party to con-
vey property in accordance with divorce decree 
were final orders and thus appealable where 
the effect of such orders was to determine sub-
stantial rights in the property and to terminate 
finally the litigation surrounding it. Cahoon v. 
Cahoon, 641 P.2d 140 (Utah 1982). 
Judgment nunc pro tunc. 
A judgment nunc pro tunc has no effect on 
the time for appeal from that judgment and 
cannot be used to reduce the time, or defeat the 
right, to take an appeal. Utah State Bldg. Bd. 
v. Walsh Plumbing Co., 16 Utah 2d 249, 399 
P.2d 141 (1965). 
Where judgment was entered on April 2 but 
the judgment recited that it was entered nunc 
pro tunc as of Februaary 24, this latter recital 
had no effect upon the time for appeal and ap-
peal could be taken by filing notice within the 
required time from April 2. Utah State Bldg. 
Bd. v. Walsh Plumbing Co., 16 Utah 2d 249, 
399 P.2d 141 (1965). 
Motion to strike. 
Order granting plaintiffs motion to strike 
defendant's pleadings is not a final order or 
judgment, and is not appealable. Nielsen v. 
Nielsen, 529 P.2d 803 (Utah 1974). 
Where defendant petitioned court for modifi-
cation of a divorce decree and alternatively 
alledged in the petition that the decree should 
be vacated and set aside, the granting of defen-
dant's motion for modification fully satisfied 
his claim and his alternative claim became 
moot, so that the court's granting of a motion 
to strike the motion to vacate and set aside was 
meaningless and no appeal would lie therefrom 
Peay v. Peay, 607 P.2d 841 (Utah 1980). 
New trial. 
An order granting a new trial is not a final 
judgment; it only sets aside the verdict and 
places the parties in the same position as if 
there had been no previous trial. Haslam v. 
Paulsen, 15 Utah 2d 185, 389 P.2d 736 (1964). 
Order denying a motion for a new trial was 
not appealable. Habbeshaw v. Habbeshaw, 17 
Utah 2d 295, 409 P.2d 972 (1966). 
Partial judgment 
Where the real issue before the court was 
whether mountain ground belonged to dece-
dent's estate or to his widow and the decree 
decided the issue against the widow, the fact 
that the court retained, jurisdiction to abjudi-
cate further matters did not leave open for re-
consideration the question as to who owned the 
property, and the decree entered was final and 
appealable and became conclusive in the ab-
sence of a timely appeal. In re Voorhees* Es-
tate, 12 Utah 2d 361, 366 P.2d 977 (1961). 
Where plaintiffs complaint contained eight 
causes of action, court's judgment on merits as 
to one cause with reservation of jurisdiction 
and judgement as to other causes was not a 
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final judgment from which an appel could be 
taken. J.B.& R.E. Walker, Inc. v. Thayn, 17 
Utah 2d 120, 405 P.2d 342 (1965). 
Where court granted one defendant's motion 
to dismiss with prejudice and entered default 
judgment in favor of that defendant on his 
counterclaim, but action against other defen-
dants and one defendant's counterclaim re-
mained alive, court's order was not final and 
an appeal from it would be dismissed. Kennedy 
v. New Era Indus., Inc., 600 P.2d 534 (Utah 
1979). 
A judgment which disposes of fewer than all 
of the causes of action alleged in the plaintiffs 
complaint is not a final judgment from which 
an appeal may be taken. Salt Lake City Corp. 
v. Layton, 600 P.2d 538 (Utah 1979). 
A partial summary judgment is not gener-
ally a final judgment and hence it is not ap-
pealable under the limitations prescribed by 
this rule. South Shores Concession, Inc. v. 
State, 600 P.2d 550 (Utah 1979). 
District court order setting aside certain pro-
visions in a default decree of divorce and pro-
viding for a further hearing on the matter was 
not a final ruling from which an appeal could 
be taken. Pearson v. Pearson, 641 P.2d 103 
(Utah 1982). 
Postjudgment orders. 
An order vacating a judgment is not a final 
order from which an appeal can be taken pur-
suant to this rule. Van Wagenen v. Walker, 
597 P.2d 1327 (Utah 1979). 
The final judgment rule does not preclude 
review of postjudgment orders; such orders 
were independently subject to the test of final-
ity, according to their own substance and ef-
fect. Cahoon v. Cahoon, 641 P.2d 140 (Utah 
1982). 
Purpose of notice. 
The object of a notice of appeal is to advise 
the opposite party that an appeal has been 
taken from a specific judgment in a particular 
case. Nunley v. Stan Katz Real Estate, Inc., 15 
Utah 2d 126, 388 P.2d 798 (1964). 
Review in equity cases. 
In the appeal of an equity case, the Supreme 
Court may weigh the facts as well as review 
the law, but will reverse on the facts only when 
the evidence clearly preponderates against the 
findings of the trial court. Crimmins v. 
Simonds, 636 P.2d 478 (Utah 1981). 
In reviewing trial court's findings of fact in 
equity cases, the Supreme Court would give 
due deference to the trial court's decision and 
reverse only when the evidence clearly prepon-
derated against the trial court's findings. 
Jensen v. Brown, 639 P.2d 150 (Utah 1981). 
Summary judgment 
Order setting aside summary judgment was 
not final judgment from which aggrieved per-
son might appeal as matter of right Jensen v. 
Nielsen, 22 Utah 2d 23, 447 P.2d 906 (1968). 
Order denying a motion for summary judg-
ment was not a final order and was not appeal-
able. Denison v. Crown Toyota Motors, Inc., 
571 P.2d 1359 (Utah 1977). 
A summary judgment in favor of one defen-
dant alone does not constitute a final order of 
judgment where the action against the remain-
ing defendant remains alive. Neider v. State 
Dep't of Transp., 665 P.2d 1306 (Utah 1983). 
Unsigned minute entry. 
An unsigned minute entry did not constitute 
an entry of judgment, nor was it a final judg-
ment for purposes of appeal. Wilson v. Man-
ning, 645 P.2d 655 (Utah 1982); Utah State 
Tax Comm'n v. Erekson, 714 P.2d 1151 (Utah 
1986); Sather v. Groaa, 727 P.2d 212 (Utah 
1986); Ahlstrom v. Anderson, 728 P.2d 979 
(Utah 1986). 
An unsigned minute entry does not consti-
tute a final order for purposes of appeal. State 
v. Crowley, 737 P.2d 198 (Utah 1987). 
COLLATERAL REFERENCES 
A.L.R. — Appealability of order suspending 
imposition or execution of sentence, 51 
A.L.R.4th 939. 
Rule 4. Appeal as of right: when taken. 
(a) Appeal from final judgment and order. In a case in which an appeal 
is permitted as a matter of right from the trial court to the appellate court, the 
notice of appeal required by Rule 3 shall be filed with the clerk of the trial 
court within 30 days after the date of entry of the judgment or order appealed 
from. However, when a judgment or order is entered in a statutory forcible 
entry or unlawful detainer action, the notice of appeal required by Rule 3 
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shall be filed with the clerk of the trial court within 10 days after the date of 
entry of the judgment or order appealed from. 
(b) Motions post judgment or order. If a timely motion under the Utah 
Kules of Civil Procedure is filed in the trial court by any party (1) for judg-
ment under Rule 50(b); (2) under Rule 52(b) to amend or make additional 
findings of fact, whether or not an alteration of the judgment would be re-
quired if the motion is granted; (3) under Rule 59 to alter or amend the 
judgment; or (4) under Rule 59 for a new trial, the time for appeal for all 
parties shall run from the entry of the order denying a new trial or granting 
or denying any other such motion. Similarly, if a timely motion under the 
Utah Rules of Criminal Procedure is filed in the trial court by any party (1) 
under Rule 24 for a new trial; or (2) under Rule 26 for an order, after judg-
ment, affecting the substantial rights of a defendant, the time for appeal for 
all parties shall run from the entry of the order denying a new trial or grant-
ing or denying any other such motion. A notice of appeal filed before the 
disposition of any of the above motions shall have no effect. A new notice of 
appeal must be filed within the prescribed time measured from the entry of 
? ?™* ° f t h e t r i a l C0Ur t d i sP° s i ng o f t h e motion as provided above 
(c) Filing prior to entry of judgment or order. Except as provided in 
paragraph (b) of this rule, a notice of appeal filed after the announcement of a 
decision judgment, or order but before the entry of the judgment or order of 
/ ^ " A J ^ 1 b e t r e a t e d a s f l l e d a f l e r su<* entry and on the day thereof. 
(d) Additional or cross-appeal. If a timely notice of appeal is filed by a 
party any other party may file a notice of appeal within 14 days after the date 
on which the first notice of appeal was filed, or within the time otherwise 
prescribed by paragraph (a) of this rule, whichever period last expires 
(e) Extension of time to appeal. The trial court, upon a showing of excus-
able neglect or good cause, may extend the time for filing a notice of appeal 
lpon motion filed not later than 30 days after the expiration of the time 
described by paragraph (a) of this rule. A motion filed before expiration of the 
prescribed time may be ex parte unless the trial court otherwise requires 
Notice of a motion filed after expiration of the prescribed time shall be given 
o the other parties m accordance with the rules of practice of the trial court 
Jo extension shall exceed 30 days past the prescribed time or 10 days from the 
ate of entry of the order granting the motion, whichever occurs later. 
NOTES TO DECISIONS 
ANALYSIS 
torney fees. 
oss-appeal. 
tension of time to appeal. 
ling of notice. 
ing with county clerk. 
lal order or judgment. 
it-judgment motions. 
imature notice. 
amsideration of order. 
neliness of notice. 
>ate of notice. 
orney fees. 
to cross-appeal is necessary where plaintiffs 
ely sought attorney's fees incurred in de-
fending their judgment on appeal. Wallis v. 
Thomas, 632 P.2d 39 (Utah 1981). 
Cross-appeal. 
Subdivision (d) requires that a notice of 
cross-appeal be timely filed. Absent a cross-ap-
peal, a respondent may not attack the judg-
ment of the court below. Henretty v. Manti 
City Corp., 791 P.2d 506 (Utah 1990) (decided 
under former R. Utah S. Ct. 4). 
Extension of time to appeal. 
Neither Rule 6(b), U.R.C.P., granting the 
court power to extend a time limit where a fail-
ure to act in time is due to excusable neglect 
generally, nor Rule 60(b)(1), U.R.C.P., autho-
rizing the court to relieve from final judgment 
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for inadvertence or excusable neglect, applies 
where a notice of appeal has not been timely 
filed. Holbrook v. Hodson, 24 Utah 2d 120, 466 
P.2d 843 (1970). 
A party could not extend the time for filing 
an appeal simply by filing a "Motion for Recon-
sideration of Order Striking Petition and Mo-
tion for Relief from Final Judgment." Peay v. 
Peay, 607 P.2d 841 (Utah 1980). 
When the question of "excusable neglect" 
arises in a jurisdictional context, as opposed to 
a nonjurisdictional context, the standard con-
templated thereby is a strict one; it is not 
meant to cover the usual excuse that the law-
yer is too busy, but is to cover emergency situa-
tions only. Prowswood, Inc. v. Mountain Fuel 
Supply Co., 676 P.2d 952 (Utah 1984). 
Filing of notice. 
The mailing of a notice of appeal was not 
equivalent to a filing of notice of appeal. 
Isaacson v. Dorius, 669 P.2d 849 (Utah 1983). 
Filing with county clerk. 
Filing with the county clerk was not a timely 
filing with the juvenile court, where there was 
no indication when the clerk transmitted a 
copy of the notice of appeal to the juvenile 
court, and the original was returned to appel-
lant's counsel. State In re M.S., 781 P.2d 1287 
(Utah Ct. App. 1989). 
Final order or judgment. 
Where the trial court signed two different 
judgments but neither party served his pre-
pared judgment on the other party before sub-
mitting it to the court, the filing of either judg-
ment would be erroneous, and an appeal taken 
from either is premature because the judg-
ments are not properly "final." Larsen v. 
Larsen, 674 P.2d 116 (Utah 1983). 
Juvenile court's order for temporary confine-
ment in a youth facility for observation and 
assessment prior to a final disposition was not 
a final order, for purposes of appeal, because it 
did not finally dispose of all issues, including 
the rights of the juvenile and/or his mother's 
rights as parental custodian. In re T.D.C., 748 
P.2d 201 (Utah Ct. App.), cert, denied, 765 P.2d 
1278 (Utah 1988). 
An unsigned minute entry is not a final 
judgment for purposes of appeal. A judgment, 
tolled by a timely post-judgment motion, starts 
to run on the date when the trial court enters 
its first signed order denying the motion. 
Gallardo v. Bolinder, 800 P.2d 816 (Utah 
1990). 
Post-judgment motions. 
Where a post-judgment motion was timely 
filed under Rule 59(a)(6), U.R.C.P., to upset the 
judgment, and notices of appeal from the judg-
ment were filed after the motion was made, but 
before the disposition of the motion, the motion 
rendered the notices of appeal ineffective, and 
notice of appeal had to be filed within the re* 
quired time from the date of the entry that 
disposed of the motion. U-M Invs. v. Ray, 658 
P.2d 1186 (Utah 1982). 
The time for appeal of an order confirming 
an arbitrator's award runs from the order 
denying appellant's timely motion to alter or 
amend that judgment under Rule 59, U.R.C.P. 
Robinson & Wells v. Warren, 669 P.2d 844 
(Utah 1983). 
The Supreme Court may not consider an ap-
peal from the dismissal of a complaint for 
unpaid overtime compensation until the trial 
court has had an opportunity to review the or-
der in question by ruling on all pending post-
judgment motions. Bailey v. Sound Lab, Inc., 
694 P.2d 1043 (Utah 1984). 
A notice of appeal filed before the disposition 
of a proper post-judgment motion is ineffective 
to confer jurisdiction upon the Supreme Court. 
Transamerica Cash Reserve, Inc. v. Hafen, 723 
P.2d 425 (Utah 1986). 
Filing a post-judgment motion of a type 
listed in this rule suspends the finality of the 
judgment, and a notice of appeal filed prior to 
disposition of such a motion by entry of a 
signed order is not effective to confer jurisdic-
tion on an appellant court. Anderson v. 
Schwendiman, 764 P.2d 999 (Utah Ct. App. 
1988). 
Premature notice. 
A notice of appeal filed after a ruling on a 
motion to alter or amend a judgment has been 
announced, but before the entry of an order 
disposing of the motion, is premature and does 
not confer jurisdiction on the court. Anderson 
v. Schwendiman, 764 P.2d 999 (Utah Ct. App. 
1988). 
Reconsideration of order. 
The Court of Appeals declined to reconsider 
and overrule its prior denial of the state's re-
quest to dismiss an appeal as untimely. State 
ex rel. C.Y. v. Yates, 765 P.2d 251 (Utah Ct. 
App. 1988). 
Timeliness of notice. 
Notice of appeal filed within the required pe-
riod from date of entry of order of contempt was 
filed timely and Supreme Court had jurisdic-
tion to hear appeal concerning the contempt 
order. Burgers v. Maiben, 652 P.2d 1320 (Utah 
1982). 
An untimely motion for a new trial had no 
effect on the running of the time for filing a 
notice of appeal. Burgers v. Maiben, 652 P.2d 
1320 (Utah 1982). 
Case was temporarily remanded to the juve-
nile court in order to allow that court to make 
a determination whether an order extending 
the time for appeal should be entered by the 
juvenile court under this rule, when it was not 
apparent whether the notice of appeal was ei-
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ther timely filed or deemed timely filed by the 30-day period set forth in this rule was not 
juvenile court. State In re M.S., 781 P.2d 1287 timely, where the notice was filed in the dis-
(Utah Ct. App. 1989). trict court more than 30 days after entry of the 
Where plaintiff, one day after the voluntary judgment being appealed. State v. Palmer, 777 
withdrawal of its motion for directed verdict, p
 2 a 521 (Utah Ct. App. 1989). 
filed a notice of appeal and also moved for an 
extension of time in which to file a notice of —Date of notice. 
appeal, the notice of appeal was timely filed, i n determining whether a notice of appeal is 
irrespective of whether the order granting ad- timely filed and establishes jurisdiction in an 
ditional time for filing had a nunc pro tunc
 a p p e i i a t e court, the appellate court is bound by 
p £ i m ^ Q a m * " * V* S ^ g 1 ' ? thefilingdateonthenoticeofappealtransmit-
R 2 N o u U X i X i a < ^ d in the prison mail by « * * * * « « * « * • * £ £ r e M S " ™ 
an incarcerated criminal defendant within the R 2 d 1 2 8 7 ^ t a h Ct. App. 1989). 
COLLATERAL REFERENCES 
A.L.R. — When will premature notice of ap-
peal be retroactively validated in federal civil 
case, 76 A.L.R. Fed. 199. 
Rule 5. Discretionary appeals from interlocutory orders. 
(a) Petition for permission to appeal* An appeal from an interlocutory 
order may be sought by any party by filing a petition for permission to appeal 
from the interlocutory order with the clerk of the appellate court with jurisdic-
tion over the case within 20 days after the entry of the order of the trial court, 
with proof of service on all other parties to the action. 
(b) Fees and copies of petition. The petitioner shall file with the Clerk of 
the Supreme Court an original and seven copies of the petition, or, with the 
Clerk of the Court of Appeals, an original and four copies, together with the 
fee for filing a notice of appeal in the trial court and the docketing fee in the 
appellate court. If an order is issued authorizing the appeal, the clerk of the 
appellate court shall immediately give notice of the order by mail to the 
respective parties and shall transmit a certified copy of the order, together 
with a copy of the petition and filing fee, to the trial court where the petition 
and order shall be filed in lieu of a notice of appeal. If the petition is denied, 
the filing fee shall be refunded. 
(c) Content of petition. The petition shall contain. 
(1)A statement of the facts necessary to an understanding of the con-
trolling question of law determined by the order sought to be reviewed; 
(2) A statement of the question of law and a demonstration that the 
question was properly raised before the trial court and ruled upon; 
(3) A statement of the reasons why an immediate interlocutory appeal 
should be permitted; and 
(4) A statement of the reason why the appeal may materially advance 
the termination of the litigation. 
(5) The petition shall include a copy of the order of the trial court from 
which an appeal is sought and any related findings of fact, conclusions of 
law and opinion. 
(d) Answer. Within 10 days after service of the petition, any other party 
may file an answer in opposition or concurrence. An original and seven copies 
of the answer shall be filed in the Supreme Court. An original and four copies 
shall be filed in the Court of Appeals. The petition and any answer shall be 
submitted without oral argument unless otherwise ordered. 
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(e) Grant of permission. An appeal from an interlocutory order may be 
granted only if it appears that the order involves substantial rights and may 
materially affect the final decision or that a determination of the correctness 
of the order before final judgment will better serve the administration and 
interests of justice. The order permitting the appeal may set forth the particu-
lar issue or point of law which will be considered and may be on such terms, 
including the filing of a bond for costs and damages, as the appellate court 
may determine. If the petition is granted, the appeal shall be deemed to have 
been docketed by the granting of the petition, and all proceedings subsequent 
to the granting of the petition shall be as, and within the time required, for 
appeals from final judgments. 
NOTES TO DECISIONS 
ANALYSIS 
Challenge to sufficiency of evidence. 
Determination regarding substantial rights. 
Irreparable damage. 
New trial motion. 
—Arbitrary exercise of authority. 
Order vacating summary judgment. 
Purpose in granting. 
When to grant 
Compiler's Notes. — All of the following 
annotations are taken from cases decided un-
der former Rule 5, R. Utah S. Ct. 
Challenge to sufficiency of evidence. 
Intermediate appeal, and not writ of habeas 
corpus, was only proper means to challenge 
sufficiency of evidence to support issuance of 
indictment and trial court's denial of defen-
dant's request for discovery of testimony of wit-
nesses before grand jury. Granato v. Salt Lake 
County Grand Jury, 557 P.2d 750 (Utah 1976). 
Determination regarding substantial 
rights. 
Where plaintiff sued for injuries suffered 
when her son's car, in which she was riding, 
collided with a cow which had fallen on high-
way from defendant's truck, preliminary order 
by the trial court that unlawful loading of the 
truck was negligence as a matter of law and 
that the trial should be held only on the issue 
of damages involved substantial rights of the 
parties and would materially affect the final 
decision and, therefore, was subject to an inter-
mediate appeal. Klafta v. Smith, 17 Utah 2d 
65, 404 P.2d 659 (1965). 
Irreparable damage. 
Temporary order allocating water usage by 
plaintiff pending further study by court raised 
sufficient issue of irreparable damage pending 
the filing of the final order fixing and decree-
ing the water rights of the respective parties as 
to be appealable. In re Water Rights, 10 Utah 
2d 77, 348 P.2d 679 (1960). 
New trial motion. 
—Arbitrary exercise of authority. 
If a trial court's authority with respect to a 
motion for a new trial is exercised arbitrarily, 
the proper redress is either in a petition for 
interlocutory appeal, which may be granted in 
a proper case, or in the preservation of error for 
review, if necessary, upon the final outcome of 
the case. Haslam v. Paulsen, 15 Utah 2d 185, 
389 P.2d 736 (1964). 
Order vacating summary judgment. 
A party does not have an appeal as a matter 
of right from an order vacating a summary 
judgment but may seek an appeal pursuant to 
this rule. Jensen v. Nielsen, 22 Utah 2d 23,447 
P.2d 906 (1968). 
Purpose in granting. 
The purpose to be served in granting an in-
terlocutory appeal is to get directly at and dis-
pose of the issues as quickly as possible, consis-
tent with thoroughness and efficiency in the 
administration of justice. Manwill v. Oyler, 11 
Utah 2d 433, 361 P.2d 177 (1961). 
When to g ran t 
The desired objective of efficiency in proce-
dure can be promoted, and an interlocutory ap-
peal is properly granted, if it appears essential 
to adjudicate principles of law or procedure in 
advance as a necessary foundation upon which 
the trial may proceed, or if there is a high like-
lihood that the litigation can be finally dis-
posed of on such an appeal. Manwill v. Oyler, 
11 Utah 2d 433, 361 P.2d 177 (1961). 
Whenever it appears likely that the matters 
in dispute can be finally disposed of upon a 
trial, or where they may become moot, or 
where they can, without involving any serious 
difficulty, abide determination in the event of 
an appeal after the trial, the desired objective 
of efficient administration of justice is best 
served by refusing to entertain an interlocu-
tory appeal and letting the case proceed to 
trial. Manwill v. Oyler, 11 Utah 2d 433, 361 
P.2d 177 (1961). 
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